It was, in a way, a surreal suggestion. “Do you want to see how İstanbul lives in LA?” asked my friend. “Just follow me.”
Under optimistic March sunshine and blue skies, we took a pleasant, smooth car ride all the way into downtown Los Angeles. When we reached Hill and 7th, we felt we were there. “Welcome to the Grand Bazaar of the West Coast,” said my friend, a second-generation Armenian of İstanbul. Sooner than I realized, I was to meet his 84-year-old father and others.
Here they have been, all spread out in jewelry boutiques, sharing various counters, all with people from “Bolso” -- as they call İstanbul. Here are all the old guys from the old town, from the districts of Kumkapı, Kadırga, Samatya and Kurtuluş. Dressed just as they used to, they gather in the grand streets of downtown L.A. to meet each other and to greet visitors. We are invited to an old alley called “Eli,” which means “passage,” where they meet regularly to talk and remember the good old days in İstanbul, its life and its great football clubs. They are the victims of nostalgia. “We are like salt on the earth,” one of them says. The analogy is clear. The Armenians are everywhere on the globe, as if somebody spread them here and there, just like grains of salt.
I am greeted with exaggerated friendliness. The fact that I am a newcomer from İstanbul is enough. There he is, the man whom everybody calls “Uncle Garbis.” He is 84 years old, looking half as young, telling me stories of his days as a tough guy in the Old Town (of İstanbul) and how many times he waved joyfully at Atatürk and even kissed his hand, as he passed by his car in Kumkapı. I am conscious of a conversation with a genuine İstanbulite, in the midst of Los Angeles, miles and hours away.
Here they are, the Anatolian Armenians, “castaways” on the West Coast. “Here we are,” says one of them, “Sentenced to life imprisonment.” Here, in one of the most pleasant climates on the earth, they do not conceal that they feel misplaced. They miss their real hometown. They are with their families, in another city, generous and comfortable, but their minds are elsewhere. Distraction is their fate.
Most of them had to leave a turbulent and hostile Turkey in the early ‘70s. It was a time of deep political divide that left little room for Armenians. They joined their kin, who had been living there since the early 20th century, and found a home in a place with a climate that resembled the Mediterranean.
There are around 800,000 Armenians living in California, mainly in the Los Angeles area. The majority come from Anatolia and İstanbul, with which they still keep contact, probably because the love for the homeland is too strong despite the fact that the memory is haunted by the painful sequence of events.
They remain Anatolians. They expect their broken hearts be met with love and care. The only healing will be through some steps for closure -- a tough task.
When I flew the first direct route of Turkish Airlines (THY) between İstanbul and Los Angeles the other day, I felt puzzled. A part of me felt cold, indifferent; the other part was joyful because the route was reconnecting a broken line of history, offering a new opening.
THY will fly the route four days a week (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday and Sunday). Its management hopes that the large Armenian diaspora (with 800,000 people) -- and the Iranian one with more or less the equal number -- will be encouraged to visit. It is a positive step, particularly for the aim of “normalizing” Turkish-Armenian relations. It is important that the Armenians of Anatolia are helped to “heal” their broken hearts, as they are encouraged to (re)visit İstanbul.
Most of them will feel attracted to it, since they fly to Yerevan. It is most welcome, since there already are direct flights between İstanbul and Yerevan, but it should be much more reasonable for THY to establish regular flights even along that route. This could be a new, small, but important step along the path of normalization, which can only take place if the people encounter each other spontaneously.
I felt that the Anatolian Armenians welcomed direct flights, and I hope that it can open a direct flight to reconciliation.
07 March 2011
Monday, May 16, 2011
Open letter to Ambassador Ricciardone
Dear Ambassador,Welcome (back) to Turkey, and welcome (back) to its mind-boggling, confusing complexities. Rest assured that most of us in the media often feel as perplexed and lost as you, as the layers of reality unfold before us.
I have a full understanding of the caution you exercised when you intended to share some concerns on press freedoms with my colleagues. As I also understand you need all the help you can get from us, to have an eye on what truly goes on.
As a keen observer of the past three decades of violations of human rights and unending problems with freedom of expression, allow me to walk you through the facts, lies, exaggerations and what lies between in the gray areas.
As I complained in my previous article, the media in Turkey is drawn to a polarization as the militancy stemming from the unprofessional tendency to belong to this or that camp rises to new heights every day. This inclination brings my colleagues closer to a blindness to the facts, distortions, fierce partisanship and conflicting narratives. Divisions are sharp, and there is still not a powerful center in the media for the defense of full-fledged democracy and professional freedom and rights.
Asymmetry in the media makes things more complicated. As I pointed out in my former article, disproportionally large segments of the media (a group controlling 65 percent of the ad revenues) continue to be on a crash course with the government and their news and column pages capitalize upon every opportunity to attack -- beyond just “criticizing” -- the government and the ruling party. The element of professional dishonesty has been dominant, but it has been exposed by other segments of the media.
As this large segment continues to elaborate on the “freedom of the press is in danger” narrative, others are opposing it. If you, for example, visit Hürriyet and Taraf, Zaman or Sözcü, you will hear completely different narratives. The more you do, the easier it will be to understand the true nature of the issue: While an increasingly larger part of the press is involved in pushing democracy agenda, lobbying for an enhancement of rights and freedoms, the other parts struggle to defend a position with the aim of delaying democracy, of blocking the steps for further reform, and covering up “dirty truths” of the past.
As you also said, the press here enjoys freedom. True, were it suppressed, we would not experience, for instance, a fiercely oppositional, loud newspaper, Sözcü, to double its circulation and become as powerfully vocal as they have. Diversity today is a fact no honest observer can deny.
In this milieu, there is great confusion about definitions, terms and figures. Many say that there are around 50 journalists in jail.
Is that true? The reputable Bianet website, an independent, leftist news source and human rights monitor largely sponsored by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Sweden, claims that there are only four. All of them Kurds and, of course, four too many.
Fifty-eight or four? The confusion is over the applied criteria. The high number refers to journalists who are jailed for alleged crimes that are not related to their professional activities.
It is a big problem, nevertheless. But the lengthy arrests that might turn into a de-facto punishment is a problem here that involves all citizens. Journalists are a loud bunch, and their voices are heard more. But, frankly, limiting the complaints only to jailed journalists is morally wrong because you are asking for privileged treatment for a specific profession, for allegations that have not much to do with our work.
Another moral dilemma is about the recent arrests in the Odatv case. If the reason for it is strictly related to publications, it must be condemned. But if not? Here, the Turkish press is again sharply divided. It is a well-known fact that the website is one of the symbols of the dark side of Turkish journalism, as it has been under fire for severe anti-Semitism, lies, character assassinations and systematic hate speech. As an American you would look at these things differently, but in a country where hate discourse on all levels is a problem for social stability, I truly hesitate to react in favor of such outlets.
Dear Ambassador, in today’s Turkey the real problem is with the 4,000 to 5,000 cases filed against journalists who try to cover politically sensitive legal cases and uncover the details of undemocratic activities. This should stop; it hinders the work we do.
Furthermore, there are around 30 articles in various laws that restrict the the field of journalism, the Law on the Internet being one of them. The judiciary implementing the laws in an illiberal manner is another grave issue. Some newspapers and reporters are bent to their knees under lawsuits. This is where the real issue is.
On a final note, let me humbly express two points: It is crucial that you talk to all parts of the media, collect their narratives in a pool and judge thereafter. Do keep in mind, too, that uninformed or ill-informed interventions by ambassadors of the US may feed anti-Americanism, as the Eric Edelman case proved. Let us keep a dialogue, to understand our complexities together.
18 February 2011
I have a full understanding of the caution you exercised when you intended to share some concerns on press freedoms with my colleagues. As I also understand you need all the help you can get from us, to have an eye on what truly goes on.
As a keen observer of the past three decades of violations of human rights and unending problems with freedom of expression, allow me to walk you through the facts, lies, exaggerations and what lies between in the gray areas.
As I complained in my previous article, the media in Turkey is drawn to a polarization as the militancy stemming from the unprofessional tendency to belong to this or that camp rises to new heights every day. This inclination brings my colleagues closer to a blindness to the facts, distortions, fierce partisanship and conflicting narratives. Divisions are sharp, and there is still not a powerful center in the media for the defense of full-fledged democracy and professional freedom and rights.
Asymmetry in the media makes things more complicated. As I pointed out in my former article, disproportionally large segments of the media (a group controlling 65 percent of the ad revenues) continue to be on a crash course with the government and their news and column pages capitalize upon every opportunity to attack -- beyond just “criticizing” -- the government and the ruling party. The element of professional dishonesty has been dominant, but it has been exposed by other segments of the media.
As this large segment continues to elaborate on the “freedom of the press is in danger” narrative, others are opposing it. If you, for example, visit Hürriyet and Taraf, Zaman or Sözcü, you will hear completely different narratives. The more you do, the easier it will be to understand the true nature of the issue: While an increasingly larger part of the press is involved in pushing democracy agenda, lobbying for an enhancement of rights and freedoms, the other parts struggle to defend a position with the aim of delaying democracy, of blocking the steps for further reform, and covering up “dirty truths” of the past.
As you also said, the press here enjoys freedom. True, were it suppressed, we would not experience, for instance, a fiercely oppositional, loud newspaper, Sözcü, to double its circulation and become as powerfully vocal as they have. Diversity today is a fact no honest observer can deny.
In this milieu, there is great confusion about definitions, terms and figures. Many say that there are around 50 journalists in jail.
Is that true? The reputable Bianet website, an independent, leftist news source and human rights monitor largely sponsored by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Sweden, claims that there are only four. All of them Kurds and, of course, four too many.
Fifty-eight or four? The confusion is over the applied criteria. The high number refers to journalists who are jailed for alleged crimes that are not related to their professional activities.
It is a big problem, nevertheless. But the lengthy arrests that might turn into a de-facto punishment is a problem here that involves all citizens. Journalists are a loud bunch, and their voices are heard more. But, frankly, limiting the complaints only to jailed journalists is morally wrong because you are asking for privileged treatment for a specific profession, for allegations that have not much to do with our work.
Another moral dilemma is about the recent arrests in the Odatv case. If the reason for it is strictly related to publications, it must be condemned. But if not? Here, the Turkish press is again sharply divided. It is a well-known fact that the website is one of the symbols of the dark side of Turkish journalism, as it has been under fire for severe anti-Semitism, lies, character assassinations and systematic hate speech. As an American you would look at these things differently, but in a country where hate discourse on all levels is a problem for social stability, I truly hesitate to react in favor of such outlets.
Dear Ambassador, in today’s Turkey the real problem is with the 4,000 to 5,000 cases filed against journalists who try to cover politically sensitive legal cases and uncover the details of undemocratic activities. This should stop; it hinders the work we do.
Furthermore, there are around 30 articles in various laws that restrict the the field of journalism, the Law on the Internet being one of them. The judiciary implementing the laws in an illiberal manner is another grave issue. Some newspapers and reporters are bent to their knees under lawsuits. This is where the real issue is.
On a final note, let me humbly express two points: It is crucial that you talk to all parts of the media, collect their narratives in a pool and judge thereafter. Do keep in mind, too, that uninformed or ill-informed interventions by ambassadors of the US may feed anti-Americanism, as the Eric Edelman case proved. Let us keep a dialogue, to understand our complexities together.
18 February 2011
Journalists as defense lawyers
Turkey’s media -- the most problematic sector in the country -- has become further polarized with the arrest warrants issued by the judge of the spectacular “Sledgehammer” case. The uniqueness of the trial is beyond question, and so is its political nature. Ten or so years ago no one could have imagined that a large chunk of high-ranking officers could even be prosecuted for crimes of this nature, let alone be put under arrest by civilian courts. Its shockwaves shattered, more than anything else, the media.
It should come as no surprise. Until a decade ago, an overwhelming part of the media was operational as an accomplice for what many today see as the “old order.” It was openly instrumentalized by the various segments of the military tutelage and, while deliberately maintaining an uncritical and obedient stand vis-à-vis the military, neglected the element of public interest in its conduct.
Every time human rights abuses of different segments of the citizenry reached new peaks during the 1980s and the 1990s, they were largely censored or (as in the case of prison riots at the end of the 1990s) watered down by official lies and sheer state propaganda.
The remnants of the professionally bankrupt and ideologically polluted media now face a huge litmus test, and a hardening struggle for survival.
The Sledgehammer case exposed most of it. Ever since a tiny, independent paper called Taraf published massive leaks on alleged subversive activities within the army between 2003 and 2004, the dilemma of journalists became apparent. Where do they stand? How should they react to the revelations, which are explosive in content? What should they do?
Whose side we should be on is a question raised by any journalist, but it comes up on rare occasions. One example is the case of the Spanish newspaper El Pais. When the Spanish parliament was stormed by mid-rank officers, the editors of the paper showed no hesitation to stand on the side of democracy. The conditions necessitate that the press take a stand because it does not survive under repression or tyranny.
There is an interesting asymmetry in Turkey now. When the society in general is supportive of legal efforts to expose anti-democratic activity (as the polls show), a disproportionately large part of the so-called mainstream media is pulled in a hysterical mood to “acquit” all those who stand accused in critical trials such as Ergenekon and Sledgehammer.
The more the editors and pundits (mainly from the powerful Doğan outlets) leave their professional roles and turn into the defense lawyers of the suspects -- which they now openly do -- some others in rival media outlets tend to adopt the role of prosecutors. Hence, we are witnessing a sharpening use of language, increased enmity and open ground for revenge.
Is there a middle ground?
The question is that of conscience and honesty. The fact of the matter is that many of our colleagues who are now willing to be identified as defense lawyers for Sledgehammer suspects know that there has been constant anti-democratic activity in the past eight years, led by certain groups of high-ranking officers, which also encompassed sympathizers from various sectors. What united them was the deep contempt, even enmity, of the elected AK Party. The number of journalists who never concealed sympathies for such projects was rather high; many of them were in key positions to “help out.”
But the issue was this: In our private conversations, we knew that they knew what was going on. There was not the slightest doubt over their intentions. Their cruel, visible signs (assassinations, acts of terror, threats, misinformation, etc.) left little room for doubt and much room for fear and uncertainty.
This is the disturbing part. It is not that many of those colleagues shrugged their shoulders when in the 1990s, for example, the local reporters sent wires on summary executions, murders by dirty warriors and “disappearances” of dissidents, this at a time when many of our colleagues were sent to jail for their courage to cover human rights abuses. It is something much more disturbing when a large group of suspects are put on trial for demolishing a democratic order and our colleagues conceal what they have actually “known” and, instead of conveying the people’s expectations of a swift and fair trial for all of them, dishonestly spread the lies that the “judiciary is being politicized.” They waste what little is left of their credibility.
The fact is that Turkey needs answers on who was involved, and to what degree, in coup plotting and junta formations. The answers will depend on the evidence and arguments and court verdicts. Do not believe media figures who act like lawyers.
16 February 2011
It should come as no surprise. Until a decade ago, an overwhelming part of the media was operational as an accomplice for what many today see as the “old order.” It was openly instrumentalized by the various segments of the military tutelage and, while deliberately maintaining an uncritical and obedient stand vis-à-vis the military, neglected the element of public interest in its conduct.
Every time human rights abuses of different segments of the citizenry reached new peaks during the 1980s and the 1990s, they were largely censored or (as in the case of prison riots at the end of the 1990s) watered down by official lies and sheer state propaganda.
The remnants of the professionally bankrupt and ideologically polluted media now face a huge litmus test, and a hardening struggle for survival.
The Sledgehammer case exposed most of it. Ever since a tiny, independent paper called Taraf published massive leaks on alleged subversive activities within the army between 2003 and 2004, the dilemma of journalists became apparent. Where do they stand? How should they react to the revelations, which are explosive in content? What should they do?
Whose side we should be on is a question raised by any journalist, but it comes up on rare occasions. One example is the case of the Spanish newspaper El Pais. When the Spanish parliament was stormed by mid-rank officers, the editors of the paper showed no hesitation to stand on the side of democracy. The conditions necessitate that the press take a stand because it does not survive under repression or tyranny.
There is an interesting asymmetry in Turkey now. When the society in general is supportive of legal efforts to expose anti-democratic activity (as the polls show), a disproportionately large part of the so-called mainstream media is pulled in a hysterical mood to “acquit” all those who stand accused in critical trials such as Ergenekon and Sledgehammer.
The more the editors and pundits (mainly from the powerful Doğan outlets) leave their professional roles and turn into the defense lawyers of the suspects -- which they now openly do -- some others in rival media outlets tend to adopt the role of prosecutors. Hence, we are witnessing a sharpening use of language, increased enmity and open ground for revenge.
Is there a middle ground?
The question is that of conscience and honesty. The fact of the matter is that many of our colleagues who are now willing to be identified as defense lawyers for Sledgehammer suspects know that there has been constant anti-democratic activity in the past eight years, led by certain groups of high-ranking officers, which also encompassed sympathizers from various sectors. What united them was the deep contempt, even enmity, of the elected AK Party. The number of journalists who never concealed sympathies for such projects was rather high; many of them were in key positions to “help out.”
But the issue was this: In our private conversations, we knew that they knew what was going on. There was not the slightest doubt over their intentions. Their cruel, visible signs (assassinations, acts of terror, threats, misinformation, etc.) left little room for doubt and much room for fear and uncertainty.
This is the disturbing part. It is not that many of those colleagues shrugged their shoulders when in the 1990s, for example, the local reporters sent wires on summary executions, murders by dirty warriors and “disappearances” of dissidents, this at a time when many of our colleagues were sent to jail for their courage to cover human rights abuses. It is something much more disturbing when a large group of suspects are put on trial for demolishing a democratic order and our colleagues conceal what they have actually “known” and, instead of conveying the people’s expectations of a swift and fair trial for all of them, dishonestly spread the lies that the “judiciary is being politicized.” They waste what little is left of their credibility.
The fact is that Turkey needs answers on who was involved, and to what degree, in coup plotting and junta formations. The answers will depend on the evidence and arguments and court verdicts. Do not believe media figures who act like lawyers.
16 February 2011
How to defend media freedom?
Starting tomorrow, I will be in Paris for a few days to engage in a media debate on two crucial topics: Freedom of expression and self-regulation in journalism. Both events will take place at UNESCO’s headquarters with people from all around the world attending.
The issues are interrelated and will never go away. Freedom of expression is a holy arena for democracies -- more so for emerging ones -- but requires a great deal of common sense and professional responsibility. That is why media accountability is a necessity: The more open and transparent the press, the easier it is to fight all sorts of despotism attempting to curb the media’s freedom.
The case of the Hungarian government versus the media was made fully visible in a growing debate that made it to the European Parliament. The new media law in Hungary paves the way for governmental control over all media activity. The content of news and commentary is under the risk of being examined by the very politicians who are the subject of the news and commentary. No matter how much the new Hungarian law contradicts the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Viktor Orban’s government seems to be indifferent.
If the media does not defend its traditional values and its role as an independent Fourth Estate, then nobody will. The examples of France and Italy show that it may even be tough for the media in established democracies to resist attempts from above to intervene in editorial content and push for censorship.
The Turkish example is also under constant supervision. It should be. The case of Turkey is problematic and complicated.
The problem arises with the applied criteria, which can be misleading.
All the international organizations monitor measures by the state apparatus, government and political power circles against the media and prepare the judgments therein. But in (South) Eastern Europe and Russia there is a phenomenon that is almost always out of the monitors’ radar: In the privately owned media landscape, the role of greedy, militant, corrupt proprietors in terms of applying censorship and causing self-censorship is proven with many examples.
“If the media owners were not involved in the thievery that went on for years here, our colleagues in those places would feel much bolder to report on the corruption and to inform the public properly. They became by the pressure of the corrupt owners part of the machinery of lying,” complained a Greek colleague of mine.
The debate on media freedom here goes in several directions. First, there are those colleagues (pundits, not reporters) affiliated with the Doğan Media Group who “confess” that they apply self-censorship because of the “fear of the government.”
They are deceiving themselves. It has been, in all cases, not the government but the owner who dismissed the columnists. They should blame their bosses because some of those dismissed columnists continue to write -- without fear -- in other anti-government outlets, such as the Sözcü daily, which is constantly growing in circulation, and Cumhuriyet.
So, the “I fear the government” discourse is a lie, a manipulation.
In a nutshell, there are two main problems that keep Turkey’s media freedom on shaky ground. The first one has to do with the legislation and the second has to with the ownership concentration in the sector. They are inseparable.
By any measure, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s suing Ahmet Altan, a bold, award-winning columnist who has helped break many taboos and revealed many stories from behind the armor of the military, is unacceptable. It follows the pattern that each time a politician or a bureaucrat feels insulted, he or she goes to court. This should stop. Simply because it will not stop people from continuing to write critically about those in power, as Turkish experience has shown for decades.
The government has to amend articles in the Penal Code, the Press Law and the Anti-Terror Law that have caused almost 5,000 criminal investigations and lawsuits, mainly against reporters. These articles seriously paralyze the professional actions informing the public. Hate speech must be banned.
Further on, the government should remove the part about “insulting Atatürk’s memory” from the Internet Law, and replace the term “obscenity” with “pornography.” If it does these simple things, 90 percent of the problems will vanish.
Finally, in order to enhance freedom of the media, the government should pay attention to recommendations by the Council of Europe and put an end to ownership concentration, which is still in place. Currently a single media group controls 65 percent of all advertisement revenues, with 45 percent in print. Limitations are crucial for a pluralist, competitive market. To complete the job, the government should ban media owners from public tenders, restrict cross-ownership and allow more than a 50 percent share of foreign capital in the audiovisual media.
24 January 2011
The issues are interrelated and will never go away. Freedom of expression is a holy arena for democracies -- more so for emerging ones -- but requires a great deal of common sense and professional responsibility. That is why media accountability is a necessity: The more open and transparent the press, the easier it is to fight all sorts of despotism attempting to curb the media’s freedom.
The case of the Hungarian government versus the media was made fully visible in a growing debate that made it to the European Parliament. The new media law in Hungary paves the way for governmental control over all media activity. The content of news and commentary is under the risk of being examined by the very politicians who are the subject of the news and commentary. No matter how much the new Hungarian law contradicts the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Viktor Orban’s government seems to be indifferent.
If the media does not defend its traditional values and its role as an independent Fourth Estate, then nobody will. The examples of France and Italy show that it may even be tough for the media in established democracies to resist attempts from above to intervene in editorial content and push for censorship.
The Turkish example is also under constant supervision. It should be. The case of Turkey is problematic and complicated.
The problem arises with the applied criteria, which can be misleading.
All the international organizations monitor measures by the state apparatus, government and political power circles against the media and prepare the judgments therein. But in (South) Eastern Europe and Russia there is a phenomenon that is almost always out of the monitors’ radar: In the privately owned media landscape, the role of greedy, militant, corrupt proprietors in terms of applying censorship and causing self-censorship is proven with many examples.
“If the media owners were not involved in the thievery that went on for years here, our colleagues in those places would feel much bolder to report on the corruption and to inform the public properly. They became by the pressure of the corrupt owners part of the machinery of lying,” complained a Greek colleague of mine.
The debate on media freedom here goes in several directions. First, there are those colleagues (pundits, not reporters) affiliated with the Doğan Media Group who “confess” that they apply self-censorship because of the “fear of the government.”
They are deceiving themselves. It has been, in all cases, not the government but the owner who dismissed the columnists. They should blame their bosses because some of those dismissed columnists continue to write -- without fear -- in other anti-government outlets, such as the Sözcü daily, which is constantly growing in circulation, and Cumhuriyet.
So, the “I fear the government” discourse is a lie, a manipulation.
In a nutshell, there are two main problems that keep Turkey’s media freedom on shaky ground. The first one has to do with the legislation and the second has to with the ownership concentration in the sector. They are inseparable.
By any measure, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s suing Ahmet Altan, a bold, award-winning columnist who has helped break many taboos and revealed many stories from behind the armor of the military, is unacceptable. It follows the pattern that each time a politician or a bureaucrat feels insulted, he or she goes to court. This should stop. Simply because it will not stop people from continuing to write critically about those in power, as Turkish experience has shown for decades.
The government has to amend articles in the Penal Code, the Press Law and the Anti-Terror Law that have caused almost 5,000 criminal investigations and lawsuits, mainly against reporters. These articles seriously paralyze the professional actions informing the public. Hate speech must be banned.
Further on, the government should remove the part about “insulting Atatürk’s memory” from the Internet Law, and replace the term “obscenity” with “pornography.” If it does these simple things, 90 percent of the problems will vanish.
Finally, in order to enhance freedom of the media, the government should pay attention to recommendations by the Council of Europe and put an end to ownership concentration, which is still in place. Currently a single media group controls 65 percent of all advertisement revenues, with 45 percent in print. Limitations are crucial for a pluralist, competitive market. To complete the job, the government should ban media owners from public tenders, restrict cross-ownership and allow more than a 50 percent share of foreign capital in the audiovisual media.
24 January 2011
What happened in the 1st Army in late 2002?
Truth has a nasty habit of coming out in the open, sooner or later. When the Taraf daily a year ago published stories on the coup plans prepared between 2002-2004 within the 1st Army Headquarters in İstanbul under the codename “Sledgehammer,” the country’s sickeningly militarist media was quick to launch a campaign to discredit the story.
Later on, the biased relatives of a commander, who now stands accused, joined the efforts to set a smokescreen by acting as amateur lawyers, declaring the evidence invalid and going as far as calling the “coup plans” a sheer lie.
The sad part was that many circles that could have remained patient and waited for more evidence to be presented to the court joined the chorus in pre-empting the verdict.
But the new findings come as a strong slap in the face. On late Tuesday, the court distributed new evidence to the lawyers of the accused 196 officers, and through them to the press. The DVDs contain material based on the search conducted at Gölcük Naval Command on Dec. 6 of last year. In that search the police found nine sacks of hidden documents, which later were investigated in the presence of military staff who served as “observers.”
The evidence, based on 43 folders, and eagerly anticipated by non-militarist press, is simply shocking. It contradicts the accounts of the accused and their defenders that there was no coup plotting. On the contrary, several crucial documents tell us that the “Sledgehammer” plan to topple the newly elected government and Parliament were being implemented already by the end of 2002. In this context, two documents are crucial.
The first, dated Dec. 17, 2002, bears the signature of Çetin Doğan, the then-commander of the 1st Army, and asks the military staff to observe and report “all reactionary activity” in the public domain to headquarters. It also asks for lists of “categorized military staff” to be prepared. This demand was circulated a week later among all the divisions within the 1st Army, and the text of the speech by Doğan to his top staff dated December 20, 2002, is also among the new evidence.
The material is extensive. It includes “death lists” that name both Hrant Dink and Etyen Mahcupyan as well as 17 other “dissidents.” It details plans to arrest certain navy and air forces commanders that must be detained during “action.”
It reveals plans intended to serve as provocations and orders to “act very discreetly.” It indicates a firm position on “exerting pressure on the chief of General Staff [Hilmi Özkök]” to increase flights over the Aegean -- and much more.
Let us not drown in the details. The most important findings are the hard disks. Until now, those arguing against the primary evidence questioned the authenticity of the CDs and DVDs. Hard disks were nowhere to be found.
Now, the investigation that has led to the discovery of hard disks, and if they prove to be the ones that “disappeared”, they will disperse all doubts for good.
The material also clarifies the timeframe and “roadmap” for the Sledgehammer plot. They also show that a flank of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had decided on taking action as soon as the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power.
That flank was hugely disappointed that the Feb. 28, 1997 action plan against what it saw as an Islamist threat did not produce the desired results. So, even if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not elected in the November 2002 polls, it did not seem to matter. A military intervention seemed all the more inevitable.
If the government did not “obey,” it would have to be weakened step by step, and go, by force.
But things were not that easy. Other powerful flanks of the TSK were against any undemocratic action. Those officers were led by Özkök, who at an early stage was informed of subversive activity within the 1st Army. It was Özkök who was a steady stumbling block before Sledgehammer plans.
People wonder how nine sacks of such material remained hidden after all these years. It can be explained only by traditional arrogance of the commanders and blind belief that “the day of revenge will come.”
No wonder ex US Aambassador James Jeffrey voices fresh fear that a coup may still be a possibility as late as last year, as revealed in a cable dated February 23 2010, made public last week by WikiLeaks.
Who is behind the findings in Gölcük? Who helped the prosecutors trace the hidden material there?
Is it not clear? As much as constant coup plotting, the army was a beehive, a hub of power struggles and a center of intrigue until very recently. It was those officers who were on the verge of being dismissed by their “coup loving,” trigger-happy generals but were then protected vigorously by Özkök and his staff who stood firm in support for democracy.
In the diaries of journalist Mustafa Balbay, the head of the civilian intelligence National Intelligence Organization (MİT) is quoted in early 2003 as warning him during a private lunch, “Watch out for the 1st Army, they are preparing a coup there.”
The head of MİT has not denied those remarks to this day.
So, it will be the new evidence, as well as the testimonies of high-level officials, that define the course and final outcome of the Sledgehammer trials, not amateurish books by relatives acting as shadow lawyers or prosecutors; or manipulative articles by militarist pundits.
21 January 2011
Later on, the biased relatives of a commander, who now stands accused, joined the efforts to set a smokescreen by acting as amateur lawyers, declaring the evidence invalid and going as far as calling the “coup plans” a sheer lie.
The sad part was that many circles that could have remained patient and waited for more evidence to be presented to the court joined the chorus in pre-empting the verdict.
But the new findings come as a strong slap in the face. On late Tuesday, the court distributed new evidence to the lawyers of the accused 196 officers, and through them to the press. The DVDs contain material based on the search conducted at Gölcük Naval Command on Dec. 6 of last year. In that search the police found nine sacks of hidden documents, which later were investigated in the presence of military staff who served as “observers.”
The evidence, based on 43 folders, and eagerly anticipated by non-militarist press, is simply shocking. It contradicts the accounts of the accused and their defenders that there was no coup plotting. On the contrary, several crucial documents tell us that the “Sledgehammer” plan to topple the newly elected government and Parliament were being implemented already by the end of 2002. In this context, two documents are crucial.
The first, dated Dec. 17, 2002, bears the signature of Çetin Doğan, the then-commander of the 1st Army, and asks the military staff to observe and report “all reactionary activity” in the public domain to headquarters. It also asks for lists of “categorized military staff” to be prepared. This demand was circulated a week later among all the divisions within the 1st Army, and the text of the speech by Doğan to his top staff dated December 20, 2002, is also among the new evidence.
The material is extensive. It includes “death lists” that name both Hrant Dink and Etyen Mahcupyan as well as 17 other “dissidents.” It details plans to arrest certain navy and air forces commanders that must be detained during “action.”
It reveals plans intended to serve as provocations and orders to “act very discreetly.” It indicates a firm position on “exerting pressure on the chief of General Staff [Hilmi Özkök]” to increase flights over the Aegean -- and much more.
Let us not drown in the details. The most important findings are the hard disks. Until now, those arguing against the primary evidence questioned the authenticity of the CDs and DVDs. Hard disks were nowhere to be found.
Now, the investigation that has led to the discovery of hard disks, and if they prove to be the ones that “disappeared”, they will disperse all doubts for good.
The material also clarifies the timeframe and “roadmap” for the Sledgehammer plot. They also show that a flank of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had decided on taking action as soon as the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power.
That flank was hugely disappointed that the Feb. 28, 1997 action plan against what it saw as an Islamist threat did not produce the desired results. So, even if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not elected in the November 2002 polls, it did not seem to matter. A military intervention seemed all the more inevitable.
If the government did not “obey,” it would have to be weakened step by step, and go, by force.
But things were not that easy. Other powerful flanks of the TSK were against any undemocratic action. Those officers were led by Özkök, who at an early stage was informed of subversive activity within the 1st Army. It was Özkök who was a steady stumbling block before Sledgehammer plans.
People wonder how nine sacks of such material remained hidden after all these years. It can be explained only by traditional arrogance of the commanders and blind belief that “the day of revenge will come.”
No wonder ex US Aambassador James Jeffrey voices fresh fear that a coup may still be a possibility as late as last year, as revealed in a cable dated February 23 2010, made public last week by WikiLeaks.
Who is behind the findings in Gölcük? Who helped the prosecutors trace the hidden material there?
Is it not clear? As much as constant coup plotting, the army was a beehive, a hub of power struggles and a center of intrigue until very recently. It was those officers who were on the verge of being dismissed by their “coup loving,” trigger-happy generals but were then protected vigorously by Özkök and his staff who stood firm in support for democracy.
In the diaries of journalist Mustafa Balbay, the head of the civilian intelligence National Intelligence Organization (MİT) is quoted in early 2003 as warning him during a private lunch, “Watch out for the 1st Army, they are preparing a coup there.”
The head of MİT has not denied those remarks to this day.
So, it will be the new evidence, as well as the testimonies of high-level officials, that define the course and final outcome of the Sledgehammer trials, not amateurish books by relatives acting as shadow lawyers or prosecutors; or manipulative articles by militarist pundits.
21 January 2011
A ‘freak statue’ and a hiccup of politics
The paradox is that this society is scarred by sharp disagreements and divisions of opinion despite the remarkable path of reform trodden over the past decade. When I ended 2010 with an article naively conveying expectations that this year would be the year of tolerance, it was for a reason. Including this newspaper, each and every institution and social segment has within it differences of opinion and, yes, this is the norm of every democratic order.
But in order for dissent to breathe the air of no fear, a sine qua non is freedom. The need for that is equally divided, whether for a large majority or a single individual against the rest. Freedom is the common cause and aim, if sincerity rules the processes of democratization.
The year began, sadly, in an opposite mood. Intolerance is in the air again.
It was first about the TV series “The Magnificent Century,” which depicts the era of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, with the ingredients of uninhibited eroticism and various forms of hedonism. It did not take long before protests took over with the tiresome theme of “distorting history” and the minister who oversees press regulations, Bülent Arınç, intervening with a call to remove it from the screen.
It was followed by another controversy over the weekend, this time kicked off by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While visiting Kars, a province bordering Armenia, made famous by a novel by Orhan Pamuk, he commented on a big statue, still under construction, saying: “They put a monstrosity there, next to the tomb of [Muslim scholar] Hasan Harakani. It is impossible to think that such a thing should exist next to fundamental works of art.” Erdoğan also expressed the hope that the statue, 35 meters high and depicting two “half” human beings facing each other with a gap in between, would be demolished by the time he comes again.
The “Statue of Humanity,” as it is called, is the work of renowned sculptor Mehmet Aksoy, a very well known and deeply respected artist in EU circles. It was commissioned by the former mayor of Kars, Naif Alibeyoğlu, in 2006. For Kars, long suffering the closed border with Armenia, this was a project to highlight the desire to “meet each other” and to reach reconciliation. The irony was that the mayor was elected from a list of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the decision to erect the statue then was made unanimously by all parties in the local city council. The Council of Monuments gave its go-ahead.
Later that year, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) local leaders changed their mind and filed a complaint that it was being built on illegitimate grounds. The same council also changed its mind and stopped the project, which already had already risen to 35 meters. When Alibeyoğlu was left out of the AK Party list and replaced by a conservative member, Nevzat Akkuş, as the new mayor in 2009, things took a nasty turn. The new mayor removed all the statues from the city and promised that the huge statue would also be demolished.
No matter how much “damage control” Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay does, Erdoğan’s latest remarks irked those who had expected a further enhancement of freedom and tolerance. They fall in sharp contrast to the diagnosis that Turkey suffers deeply from disrespect of diversity of opinion, but it also reveals inherent intolerance for artists. Erdoğan, who was sentenced to prison in a clear breach of respect for free speech after reciting a poem, should know better, is the judgment.
Are the cases of “The Magnificent Century” and the “freak statue” symbols of growing conservatism? “Yes” would be a shallow response. In a much broader context, it is a picture of Turkey -- and its people -- that are the hostages of a deeply rooted taboo culture. When the movie “Mustafa,” which is about Atatürk, was shown recently, the entire Kemalist segment hit the roof, simply because he was depicted with a number of weaknesses and recurrent depression. A group of Republican People’s Party (CHP)-linked youths not long ago stormed an exhibition making a mockery of “the Atatürk cult.” Those who demonstrated in front of the Show TV headquarters against the Süleyman series or those who supported the remarks against the statue were silent about the others’ intolerance and, of course, vice versa.
So it goes on and on. The entire history of the republic was marked, in one way or another, with the urge of the power to conduct social engineering and design the “proper lifestyle” for the people. The risk now is the corrupting characteristic of power, again. Those who represent tolerant conservatism within the AK Party should revisit the results of the referendum and raise their voices against the tendencies of intolerance -- for freedom and to let the other live in freedom, together, side by side.
The people here no longer want to be treated like children; those days should end.
But in order for dissent to breathe the air of no fear, a sine qua non is freedom. The need for that is equally divided, whether for a large majority or a single individual against the rest. Freedom is the common cause and aim, if sincerity rules the processes of democratization.
The year began, sadly, in an opposite mood. Intolerance is in the air again.
It was first about the TV series “The Magnificent Century,” which depicts the era of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, with the ingredients of uninhibited eroticism and various forms of hedonism. It did not take long before protests took over with the tiresome theme of “distorting history” and the minister who oversees press regulations, Bülent Arınç, intervening with a call to remove it from the screen.
It was followed by another controversy over the weekend, this time kicked off by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While visiting Kars, a province bordering Armenia, made famous by a novel by Orhan Pamuk, he commented on a big statue, still under construction, saying: “They put a monstrosity there, next to the tomb of [Muslim scholar] Hasan Harakani. It is impossible to think that such a thing should exist next to fundamental works of art.” Erdoğan also expressed the hope that the statue, 35 meters high and depicting two “half” human beings facing each other with a gap in between, would be demolished by the time he comes again.
The “Statue of Humanity,” as it is called, is the work of renowned sculptor Mehmet Aksoy, a very well known and deeply respected artist in EU circles. It was commissioned by the former mayor of Kars, Naif Alibeyoğlu, in 2006. For Kars, long suffering the closed border with Armenia, this was a project to highlight the desire to “meet each other” and to reach reconciliation. The irony was that the mayor was elected from a list of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the decision to erect the statue then was made unanimously by all parties in the local city council. The Council of Monuments gave its go-ahead.
Later that year, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) local leaders changed their mind and filed a complaint that it was being built on illegitimate grounds. The same council also changed its mind and stopped the project, which already had already risen to 35 meters. When Alibeyoğlu was left out of the AK Party list and replaced by a conservative member, Nevzat Akkuş, as the new mayor in 2009, things took a nasty turn. The new mayor removed all the statues from the city and promised that the huge statue would also be demolished.
No matter how much “damage control” Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay does, Erdoğan’s latest remarks irked those who had expected a further enhancement of freedom and tolerance. They fall in sharp contrast to the diagnosis that Turkey suffers deeply from disrespect of diversity of opinion, but it also reveals inherent intolerance for artists. Erdoğan, who was sentenced to prison in a clear breach of respect for free speech after reciting a poem, should know better, is the judgment.
Are the cases of “The Magnificent Century” and the “freak statue” symbols of growing conservatism? “Yes” would be a shallow response. In a much broader context, it is a picture of Turkey -- and its people -- that are the hostages of a deeply rooted taboo culture. When the movie “Mustafa,” which is about Atatürk, was shown recently, the entire Kemalist segment hit the roof, simply because he was depicted with a number of weaknesses and recurrent depression. A group of Republican People’s Party (CHP)-linked youths not long ago stormed an exhibition making a mockery of “the Atatürk cult.” Those who demonstrated in front of the Show TV headquarters against the Süleyman series or those who supported the remarks against the statue were silent about the others’ intolerance and, of course, vice versa.
So it goes on and on. The entire history of the republic was marked, in one way or another, with the urge of the power to conduct social engineering and design the “proper lifestyle” for the people. The risk now is the corrupting characteristic of power, again. Those who represent tolerant conservatism within the AK Party should revisit the results of the referendum and raise their voices against the tendencies of intolerance -- for freedom and to let the other live in freedom, together, side by side.
The people here no longer want to be treated like children; those days should end.
Monday, December 13, 2010
Öcalan’s olive branch
His surprise move is Abdullah Öcalan’s latest attempt to approach the Gülen movement. In a recent meeting with his lawyers on the island of İmralı, where he is imprisoned, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader said the following: “I have never denied their [the Gülen movement’s] existence, and expect them to do the same.
Both we [i.e., the PKK] and they are important actors in the Middle East. If these two dynamic powers build a mutual understanding of each other and stand in solidarity, many of Turkey’s problems can be resolved.”
This is an unusual extension of an olive branch and became visible with Öcalan’s three lawyers meeting with Hüseyin Gülerce, a columnist with the Zaman and Today’s Zaman dailies, in the town of Yalova after these remarks.
In his column yesterday in the Zaman daily, Gülerce confirmed the event and gave further details. It is well known that our colleague is a highly respected opinion maker who is close to Fethullah Gülen, though he is keen to remind us that he has never been a spokesperson of the Gülen movement of volunteers. But it is also well known that his views weigh heavily in that domain.
Gülerce wrote that he had put forth two conditions to the lawyers for a lasting solution of the Kurdish problem, which he calls the greatest challenge before Turkey: sincerity and (rhetorical) style. He explained it in the following words:
“There are representatives and spokespersons of the PKK on the mountains, in İmralı, in Europe… There are countries that do not wish to see a stabilizing, strengthening Turkey. Inside [Turkey] there are those who make huge profits through human, weapon and drug smuggling. The situation is truly complicated. That is why sincerity is a must. Unless the conscience of Turks and Kurds plays an active role, a solution becomes even more remote. Style is also of vital importance. Bullying and pushiness are known to be obstructive elements. Just as some wise men enter into the process, a spokesperson of, say, the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP], can mess a lot of things up with words.”
Gülerce wrote that he had told the lawyers a solution must be built on democratic ground -- based on the rule of law, equality, freedom of expression, conscience and belief, and through Parliament. Gestures should suggest opening doors to peace.
In a surprise response, one of Öcalan’s lawyers asked Gülerce: “What if a BDP delegation visits the cemeteries in Çanakkale [Gallipoli]?” To which he responded, “That is what I mean by gestures.” When Gülerce complained to them that the BDP is unable to be a “party of all of Turkey,” they responded that “that is exactly what our ‘client’ says all the time.”
The meeting was, as reported by the Taraf daily yesterday, followed by the same group of lawyers meeting with some “officials,” again in Yalova. The contacts were also reported by the pro-Kurdish Fırat news agency.
What does it all mean? First, it has become clear that Öcalan has engaged in some serious rethinking after the critical Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting and the referendum in mid-September. Until lately, he seemed convinced that the real counterpart would be the state (and the military). No longer. He realizes that the AK Party government is an increasingly powerful player whose basic instincts are constantly pro-solution and whose investment in infrastructure in the region has a strong impact on the “locals.” The new olive branch extended to Gülen’s movement of volunteers is also a reflection of the realization that a solution can be sped up and consolidated by this pious, widespread and benevolent civil society formation.
At this critical stage, where Turkey is pacing towards a critical election in June, after which a full-scale debate and a “conclusion” on a brand new constitution seems inevitable, the involvement of the Gülen movement is crucial, as much as Kurdish political figures’ cautiousness to keep guns and mines silent. In this context, Öcalan’s recent remarks on extending the “cease-fire” until June, and not March as previously reported, are positive signs. At the moment, the primary duty is to avoid any provocation, big or small.
Both we [i.e., the PKK] and they are important actors in the Middle East. If these two dynamic powers build a mutual understanding of each other and stand in solidarity, many of Turkey’s problems can be resolved.”
This is an unusual extension of an olive branch and became visible with Öcalan’s three lawyers meeting with Hüseyin Gülerce, a columnist with the Zaman and Today’s Zaman dailies, in the town of Yalova after these remarks.
In his column yesterday in the Zaman daily, Gülerce confirmed the event and gave further details. It is well known that our colleague is a highly respected opinion maker who is close to Fethullah Gülen, though he is keen to remind us that he has never been a spokesperson of the Gülen movement of volunteers. But it is also well known that his views weigh heavily in that domain.
Gülerce wrote that he had put forth two conditions to the lawyers for a lasting solution of the Kurdish problem, which he calls the greatest challenge before Turkey: sincerity and (rhetorical) style. He explained it in the following words:
“There are representatives and spokespersons of the PKK on the mountains, in İmralı, in Europe… There are countries that do not wish to see a stabilizing, strengthening Turkey. Inside [Turkey] there are those who make huge profits through human, weapon and drug smuggling. The situation is truly complicated. That is why sincerity is a must. Unless the conscience of Turks and Kurds plays an active role, a solution becomes even more remote. Style is also of vital importance. Bullying and pushiness are known to be obstructive elements. Just as some wise men enter into the process, a spokesperson of, say, the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP], can mess a lot of things up with words.”
Gülerce wrote that he had told the lawyers a solution must be built on democratic ground -- based on the rule of law, equality, freedom of expression, conscience and belief, and through Parliament. Gestures should suggest opening doors to peace.
In a surprise response, one of Öcalan’s lawyers asked Gülerce: “What if a BDP delegation visits the cemeteries in Çanakkale [Gallipoli]?” To which he responded, “That is what I mean by gestures.” When Gülerce complained to them that the BDP is unable to be a “party of all of Turkey,” they responded that “that is exactly what our ‘client’ says all the time.”
The meeting was, as reported by the Taraf daily yesterday, followed by the same group of lawyers meeting with some “officials,” again in Yalova. The contacts were also reported by the pro-Kurdish Fırat news agency.
What does it all mean? First, it has become clear that Öcalan has engaged in some serious rethinking after the critical Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting and the referendum in mid-September. Until lately, he seemed convinced that the real counterpart would be the state (and the military). No longer. He realizes that the AK Party government is an increasingly powerful player whose basic instincts are constantly pro-solution and whose investment in infrastructure in the region has a strong impact on the “locals.” The new olive branch extended to Gülen’s movement of volunteers is also a reflection of the realization that a solution can be sped up and consolidated by this pious, widespread and benevolent civil society formation.
At this critical stage, where Turkey is pacing towards a critical election in June, after which a full-scale debate and a “conclusion” on a brand new constitution seems inevitable, the involvement of the Gülen movement is crucial, as much as Kurdish political figures’ cautiousness to keep guns and mines silent. In this context, Öcalan’s recent remarks on extending the “cease-fire” until June, and not March as previously reported, are positive signs. At the moment, the primary duty is to avoid any provocation, big or small.
Outside, looking in
Foreign ministers of the European Union meet today in Brussels at the General Affairs Council to discuss, among other issues, enlargement.
To claim that the meeting will be marked by a jolly mood would be an exaggeration. The EU is being dragged into one of its worst financial crises ever, and the unease among its populations regarding “the other” is becoming very vocal. Xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiments are on the rise and extreme right wing parties gain more ground as a result of growing irrationality fuelled by self-centeredness.
It becomes difficult, but even more necessary, to discuss the future under such circumstances. The more social and economic problems are visible, the louder they tell us that there is something seriously wrong with the policies. Some leaders feel it is time to dig deeper, while the others seem lost in the vortex of thought.
With the Greek and Irish crises developing, and with the ones in Portugal and Spain looming on the horizon, it is inevitable that eyes will now be more focused on the successful parts of the story called Turkey. As some predicted, the discussions on the future of the EU will have to be linked to Turkey, since the current state of affairs within the union shows that the seemingly desperate attempts by some cynical members to isolate Turkey where it is, or to divert it away, have been foolish and unsuccessful.
Jack Straw, a former British foreign secretary, complained in blunt terms that “some centers in the EU” had no idea why they were acting like that. “When I met them I always asked what was their strategy behind keeping Turkey away, and they just looked at me with no clear answer,” he said in a recent TV interview with a Turkish colleague. “They have absolutely no strategy on Turkey other than obstruction.”
There is growing worry among some others. There are no more chapters in the accession negotiations with Turkey that can be opened at the moment, as Greek Cyprus blocks some and France seems rather determined to obstruct certain chapters that pave the way to full membership.
“EU integration is about strengthening the rule of law and common European values and standards all over the Continent. This is apparent not least in Turkey, where EU-inspired liberal reforms have turned the country into one of Europe’s principal growth engines,” wrote four foreign ministers in a joint article published by The New York Times some days ago.
Carl Bildt of Sweden, Franco Frattini of Italy, William Hague of Great Britain and Alexander Stubb of Finland have reason to powerfully argue in these confusing times that Turkey may actually be a driving force in making the EU as extroverted as it was envisioned by its founding fathers in the ‘50s. Their article is a devastating critique of the neocon-generated “axis shift” thesis which found some ground in the US capital.
“The crucial question,” they write, “is not whether Turkey is turning its back on Europe, but rather if Europe is turning its back on the fundamental values and principles that have guided European integration over the last 50 years.”
Although they admit that there are concerns that admitting a large nation would upset some balances within the union, they say: “New members can help Europe return to economic dynamism and take on its proper weight in world affairs. By pushing prospective candidates toward liberal reforms and full respect for human rights, the European space of stability and growth can expand further. In the back of our minds we should also remember that Turkey, like no other country, has the ability to advance European interests in security, trade and energy networks from the Far East to the Mediterranean. …
“Turkey is in a class of its own. It is an influential actor on the world stage with considerable soft power. Its economy is expected to expand by more than 5 percent this year, compared with a eurozone average of 1 percent. The [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] OECD predicts that Turkey will be the second-largest economy in Europe by 2050.
“Turkish entrepreneurs in Europe already run 40 billion euros worth of businesses and employ 500,000 people. A Turkish economy in the EU would create new opportunities for exporters and investors, and link us to markets and energy sources in central Asia and the near east. So the security and economic case for Turkish membership is strong. …
“Let us be clear: The Union’s exacting standards of democracy and rule of law require a welcome but time-consuming reform process. However, the magnetism and the transformational capacity of enlargement works only if commitments are kept on both sides.”
The authors are keen on reminding their colleagues that the more the credibility of the enlargement process is damaged, the weaker the European Union will be. To be a powerful actor, in particular where Turkey is concerned, it is high time that a strategy is debated on the specific case of this country, including a “deadline” for a full accession -- however remote in time it may be. The issue can no longer be kept adrift.
To claim that the meeting will be marked by a jolly mood would be an exaggeration. The EU is being dragged into one of its worst financial crises ever, and the unease among its populations regarding “the other” is becoming very vocal. Xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiments are on the rise and extreme right wing parties gain more ground as a result of growing irrationality fuelled by self-centeredness.
It becomes difficult, but even more necessary, to discuss the future under such circumstances. The more social and economic problems are visible, the louder they tell us that there is something seriously wrong with the policies. Some leaders feel it is time to dig deeper, while the others seem lost in the vortex of thought.
With the Greek and Irish crises developing, and with the ones in Portugal and Spain looming on the horizon, it is inevitable that eyes will now be more focused on the successful parts of the story called Turkey. As some predicted, the discussions on the future of the EU will have to be linked to Turkey, since the current state of affairs within the union shows that the seemingly desperate attempts by some cynical members to isolate Turkey where it is, or to divert it away, have been foolish and unsuccessful.
Jack Straw, a former British foreign secretary, complained in blunt terms that “some centers in the EU” had no idea why they were acting like that. “When I met them I always asked what was their strategy behind keeping Turkey away, and they just looked at me with no clear answer,” he said in a recent TV interview with a Turkish colleague. “They have absolutely no strategy on Turkey other than obstruction.”
There is growing worry among some others. There are no more chapters in the accession negotiations with Turkey that can be opened at the moment, as Greek Cyprus blocks some and France seems rather determined to obstruct certain chapters that pave the way to full membership.
“EU integration is about strengthening the rule of law and common European values and standards all over the Continent. This is apparent not least in Turkey, where EU-inspired liberal reforms have turned the country into one of Europe’s principal growth engines,” wrote four foreign ministers in a joint article published by The New York Times some days ago.
Carl Bildt of Sweden, Franco Frattini of Italy, William Hague of Great Britain and Alexander Stubb of Finland have reason to powerfully argue in these confusing times that Turkey may actually be a driving force in making the EU as extroverted as it was envisioned by its founding fathers in the ‘50s. Their article is a devastating critique of the neocon-generated “axis shift” thesis which found some ground in the US capital.
“The crucial question,” they write, “is not whether Turkey is turning its back on Europe, but rather if Europe is turning its back on the fundamental values and principles that have guided European integration over the last 50 years.”
Although they admit that there are concerns that admitting a large nation would upset some balances within the union, they say: “New members can help Europe return to economic dynamism and take on its proper weight in world affairs. By pushing prospective candidates toward liberal reforms and full respect for human rights, the European space of stability and growth can expand further. In the back of our minds we should also remember that Turkey, like no other country, has the ability to advance European interests in security, trade and energy networks from the Far East to the Mediterranean. …
“Turkey is in a class of its own. It is an influential actor on the world stage with considerable soft power. Its economy is expected to expand by more than 5 percent this year, compared with a eurozone average of 1 percent. The [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] OECD predicts that Turkey will be the second-largest economy in Europe by 2050.
“Turkish entrepreneurs in Europe already run 40 billion euros worth of businesses and employ 500,000 people. A Turkish economy in the EU would create new opportunities for exporters and investors, and link us to markets and energy sources in central Asia and the near east. So the security and economic case for Turkish membership is strong. …
“Let us be clear: The Union’s exacting standards of democracy and rule of law require a welcome but time-consuming reform process. However, the magnetism and the transformational capacity of enlargement works only if commitments are kept on both sides.”
The authors are keen on reminding their colleagues that the more the credibility of the enlargement process is damaged, the weaker the European Union will be. To be a powerful actor, in particular where Turkey is concerned, it is high time that a strategy is debated on the specific case of this country, including a “deadline” for a full accession -- however remote in time it may be. The issue can no longer be kept adrift.
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Axis shield
Now that NATO’s Lisbon Summit is over, there should presumably be fewer concerns left as compared to ones earlier about where Turkey stands in its vocation on the ever-changing global map of power.
Overall, the summit seems to have achieved its envisioned results -- in general terms -- and the leaders got what they hoped for. There is now an agreement on a missile defense system which will cover the entire territory of NATO’s European allies (although there will be much work left on structuring the system and fine-tuning its command and control mechanism in a coherent and functional framework). The Russians have been “won”: There will for the first time in history be a coordinated defense model which aims to bring together Moscow and NATO to direct cooperation. Agreement has also been reached on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Is Ankara, too, content? According to President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, yes, very much so. In the past weeks, there has been a lot of publicity and alarmism in the international press, as if Turkey had already shifted its axis in favor of its Muslim brotherhood, and would behave like an “enfant noir”; this occurred, with voluntary backing of the neocon camp and the Israel lobby. Gül was certainly right when he complained of “psychological warfare” targeting his country.
There was certainly a great deal of unease as the leaders entered the talks. It was not entirely about the missile shield. Beyond that, Lisbon came to symbolize a historic, defining point about NATO’s new collective defense model, and its global role in a rapidly evolving, volatile environment.
Ankara was deeply concerned and involved with the outcome, the (re)shaping of the Strategic Concept. Gül and Davutoğlu reaffirmed Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s updated mission, as they managed to help allies reach a smooth agreement on “indivisible defense,” which strengthens the level of engagement in the event of hostility against individual allies.
So, it looks as if the actors engaging in psychological war against the current Turkish administration ended with a considerable amount of disappointment. Turks played ball, but friction that marked the summit appeared between France and others.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy heavily insisted on specifying country and region, when the missile shield issue was on the table. It was hard to understand the reasons for his insistence because when it comes to projects such as the one agreed upon, the threat is not equaled to any specific country; it is a practice that dates back to the earliest days of the Cold War.
Why did Paris insist? One possible explanation is that Sarkozy wanted to expand ground by winning over powerful allies around the idea in order to corner, alienate and expose Turkey as an “enfant noir,” but if his plan was so, it failed badly for him.
The concealed idea to bash Turkey through the issue of Cyprus seems also to have backfired. Thanks to the fair attitude of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary-general, the unfair treatment of Turkey in the past decade was thoroughly exposed.
Furthermore, the difference between the old and new attitudes became even more apparent in an exchange between President Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Gül during the same dinner. When the issue of NATO-EU relations was discussed, the former two apparently asserted that Ankara was blocking them due to its policies on Cyprus.
Gül’s response was firm. “We have a crisis of confidence with you,” he said. “You do not stick to your promises. The EU promised Turkey would be part of the European Defense Agency, which never happened. The security treaty between Turkey and the EU has not been signed either. These have caused mistrust towards you. You must fulfill your promises.”
To the objection that the “EU has principles” and “it has to protect the rights of its members [Cyprus],” Gül’s response was also firm. “I agree that principles are crucial. Why then did you not remember those principles when you accepted Cyprus as a member? The principle was never to accept a member that has problems with a neighbor and that has a dossier of conflict at the UN Security Council. You may say that Cyprus as an EU member is a fact of life, but it is also a fact of life that Greek Cyprus does not represent the entire island.”
These words reflect the real fact that Turkey and Cyprus will remain big problems both for the EU and NATO as the symmetry created calls for a bold and flexible solution to satisfy all parties.
Nevertheless, the end result of the summit for NATO and Turkey may help all concerned relax. “This [agreement] can carry NATO for 10-15 years,” Gül said. Meanwhile, there is much work to do to consolidate Turkey’s position in the axis. Myths on Turkey “shifting away” have received a huge blow.
Overall, the summit seems to have achieved its envisioned results -- in general terms -- and the leaders got what they hoped for. There is now an agreement on a missile defense system which will cover the entire territory of NATO’s European allies (although there will be much work left on structuring the system and fine-tuning its command and control mechanism in a coherent and functional framework). The Russians have been “won”: There will for the first time in history be a coordinated defense model which aims to bring together Moscow and NATO to direct cooperation. Agreement has also been reached on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Is Ankara, too, content? According to President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, yes, very much so. In the past weeks, there has been a lot of publicity and alarmism in the international press, as if Turkey had already shifted its axis in favor of its Muslim brotherhood, and would behave like an “enfant noir”; this occurred, with voluntary backing of the neocon camp and the Israel lobby. Gül was certainly right when he complained of “psychological warfare” targeting his country.
There was certainly a great deal of unease as the leaders entered the talks. It was not entirely about the missile shield. Beyond that, Lisbon came to symbolize a historic, defining point about NATO’s new collective defense model, and its global role in a rapidly evolving, volatile environment.
Ankara was deeply concerned and involved with the outcome, the (re)shaping of the Strategic Concept. Gül and Davutoğlu reaffirmed Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s updated mission, as they managed to help allies reach a smooth agreement on “indivisible defense,” which strengthens the level of engagement in the event of hostility against individual allies.
So, it looks as if the actors engaging in psychological war against the current Turkish administration ended with a considerable amount of disappointment. Turks played ball, but friction that marked the summit appeared between France and others.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy heavily insisted on specifying country and region, when the missile shield issue was on the table. It was hard to understand the reasons for his insistence because when it comes to projects such as the one agreed upon, the threat is not equaled to any specific country; it is a practice that dates back to the earliest days of the Cold War.
Why did Paris insist? One possible explanation is that Sarkozy wanted to expand ground by winning over powerful allies around the idea in order to corner, alienate and expose Turkey as an “enfant noir,” but if his plan was so, it failed badly for him.
The concealed idea to bash Turkey through the issue of Cyprus seems also to have backfired. Thanks to the fair attitude of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary-general, the unfair treatment of Turkey in the past decade was thoroughly exposed.
Furthermore, the difference between the old and new attitudes became even more apparent in an exchange between President Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Gül during the same dinner. When the issue of NATO-EU relations was discussed, the former two apparently asserted that Ankara was blocking them due to its policies on Cyprus.
Gül’s response was firm. “We have a crisis of confidence with you,” he said. “You do not stick to your promises. The EU promised Turkey would be part of the European Defense Agency, which never happened. The security treaty between Turkey and the EU has not been signed either. These have caused mistrust towards you. You must fulfill your promises.”
To the objection that the “EU has principles” and “it has to protect the rights of its members [Cyprus],” Gül’s response was also firm. “I agree that principles are crucial. Why then did you not remember those principles when you accepted Cyprus as a member? The principle was never to accept a member that has problems with a neighbor and that has a dossier of conflict at the UN Security Council. You may say that Cyprus as an EU member is a fact of life, but it is also a fact of life that Greek Cyprus does not represent the entire island.”
These words reflect the real fact that Turkey and Cyprus will remain big problems both for the EU and NATO as the symmetry created calls for a bold and flexible solution to satisfy all parties.
Nevertheless, the end result of the summit for NATO and Turkey may help all concerned relax. “This [agreement] can carry NATO for 10-15 years,” Gül said. Meanwhile, there is much work to do to consolidate Turkey’s position in the axis. Myths on Turkey “shifting away” have received a huge blow.
CHP: Into the unknown
As soon as he felt a bit safer with regard to the fragile political landscape after his entry as chairman of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), one of the most defining moments for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was to assemble a conference with a limited and secretive attendance that strictly adhered to the Chatham House Rule.
The meeting, which ended with a series of ideas and proposals for a new identity and direction, preceded the “operation” of ousting Önder Sav from the post of secretary-general within a matter of days.
Those with insider knowledge of the meeting cannot conceal their surprise at how quickly Kılıçdaroğlu moved in to “implement” some of the decisive major points underlined in the meeting. One insider commented, “Usually it takes a leader time to absorb the content before acting, but in this case he saw the opportunity and did not hesitate.”
There is a lot of truth in this, showing where Kılıçdaroğlu is moving to turn his chairmanship into leadership, in the slippery, treacherous environment called the CHP. His ensuing steps confirmed that they will either make or break his party.
It is hard to know whether or not he impressed his comrades in the Socialist International, but he clearly displayed the profile of a leader exactly opposite that of Deniz Baykal, his predecessor. Kılıçdaroğlu has the old leftist in his DNA, which helps to establish a common terminology and new prospects with the SI community.
While in Paris he went even further, and did something Baykal never would do: He visited Père Lachaise Cemetery and laid flowers at the graves of two Kurds -- the legendary Marxist director Yılmaz Güney and Kurdish singer Ahmet Kaya. He topped his surprise moves with a visit to Diyarbakır, where he met locals and talked about what he calls “the new CHP” attempting to create a “third path” between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) as a “democratic alternative” to shape a “united or allied left” and challenge the current status quo. These remarks came as some politicians even discussed the (remote) possibility of a CHP-BDP alliance in the next elections. Fruitless or far fetched as these moves look, they tell us that Kılıçdaroğlu intends to push his party into new waters.
But, he is only in the beginning of a tough journey. Challenges will be multifaceted, both inside and outside. Kılıçdaroğlu knows that the old Baykal line is an infinite loser, but it is doubtful he knows how to convince party people. For this, he needs to convince himself that the party’s worn out ideology, Kemalism, must at least be sharply revised to harmonize with the democratic left -- a very arduous task. The widely shared belief among the party’s modern flank and outside observers is that leaving behind the legacy of Kemalism is the only way for the party to be integrated into civilian politics and to be “normalized.” This is a precondition for Turkey’s major, chronic issues to be resolved by consensus.
Every step he takes brings the party closer to a watershed. Now, the next issue is whether or not Kılıçdaroğlu will need to hastily assemble an extraordinary congress, possibly before the end of the year. The reason is obvious: He controls only one-fourth of the party assembly, which defines the candidate deputy lists for the next elections. Baykal and Sav lurk in the background and still have considerable power. Should the new leader keep the party assembly intact, he may face an uphill battle and end up breathless. To consolidate his power even more, the need for a congress seems inevitable as days go by.
His own identity as an Alevi from Dersim is both an asset and a disadvantage. As this helps him win back the Alevis and warm up to Kurds, the old elite of the CHP feel increasingly uncertain about his intentions. Kılıçdaroğlu has so far moved in the area of what is possible, and it may not be enough. At the moment he is on a move into the unknown.
The meeting, which ended with a series of ideas and proposals for a new identity and direction, preceded the “operation” of ousting Önder Sav from the post of secretary-general within a matter of days.
Those with insider knowledge of the meeting cannot conceal their surprise at how quickly Kılıçdaroğlu moved in to “implement” some of the decisive major points underlined in the meeting. One insider commented, “Usually it takes a leader time to absorb the content before acting, but in this case he saw the opportunity and did not hesitate.”
There is a lot of truth in this, showing where Kılıçdaroğlu is moving to turn his chairmanship into leadership, in the slippery, treacherous environment called the CHP. His ensuing steps confirmed that they will either make or break his party.
It is hard to know whether or not he impressed his comrades in the Socialist International, but he clearly displayed the profile of a leader exactly opposite that of Deniz Baykal, his predecessor. Kılıçdaroğlu has the old leftist in his DNA, which helps to establish a common terminology and new prospects with the SI community.
While in Paris he went even further, and did something Baykal never would do: He visited Père Lachaise Cemetery and laid flowers at the graves of two Kurds -- the legendary Marxist director Yılmaz Güney and Kurdish singer Ahmet Kaya. He topped his surprise moves with a visit to Diyarbakır, where he met locals and talked about what he calls “the new CHP” attempting to create a “third path” between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) as a “democratic alternative” to shape a “united or allied left” and challenge the current status quo. These remarks came as some politicians even discussed the (remote) possibility of a CHP-BDP alliance in the next elections. Fruitless or far fetched as these moves look, they tell us that Kılıçdaroğlu intends to push his party into new waters.
But, he is only in the beginning of a tough journey. Challenges will be multifaceted, both inside and outside. Kılıçdaroğlu knows that the old Baykal line is an infinite loser, but it is doubtful he knows how to convince party people. For this, he needs to convince himself that the party’s worn out ideology, Kemalism, must at least be sharply revised to harmonize with the democratic left -- a very arduous task. The widely shared belief among the party’s modern flank and outside observers is that leaving behind the legacy of Kemalism is the only way for the party to be integrated into civilian politics and to be “normalized.” This is a precondition for Turkey’s major, chronic issues to be resolved by consensus.
Every step he takes brings the party closer to a watershed. Now, the next issue is whether or not Kılıçdaroğlu will need to hastily assemble an extraordinary congress, possibly before the end of the year. The reason is obvious: He controls only one-fourth of the party assembly, which defines the candidate deputy lists for the next elections. Baykal and Sav lurk in the background and still have considerable power. Should the new leader keep the party assembly intact, he may face an uphill battle and end up breathless. To consolidate his power even more, the need for a congress seems inevitable as days go by.
His own identity as an Alevi from Dersim is both an asset and a disadvantage. As this helps him win back the Alevis and warm up to Kurds, the old elite of the CHP feel increasingly uncertain about his intentions. Kılıçdaroğlu has so far moved in the area of what is possible, and it may not be enough. At the moment he is on a move into the unknown.
Monday, October 25, 2010
‘Healthy man of sick Europe’
As what the Economist notes as a “welcome rise” of Turkey in the economic and international policy field becomes increasingly visible, the state of confusion within the EU about Turkey is more clearly exposed.
It is an interesting type of development. In the first half of the now ending decade, what pushed Turkey ahead in terms of substantial change was the enormous dynamic of the prospect of membership in the union, and despite the quickly fading desire in Europe to accept its progress as an indication to speed up membership talks, Turkey accelerates its normalization nevertheless.
What is wrong then, and where? It is obvious that the main denominator for things having taken a negative turn is the lack of leadership within the EU. Its current state is of aimlessness, fatigue over political direction, shortsighted foreign policy and weakening coordination of economic management. What suffers most because of these factors is the enlargement policy.
What today’s Turkey -- as opposed to the Turkey of, say, 2002 -- sees in the EU of today is a picture of a destiny much less desired. As today’s Turkish society is more and more involved in a peaceful debate on the role of religion in politics and developing modalities over dealing fairly with diversity, etc., the old continent is sending out signals of increasing intolerance for its diversity and suffers from a growing extremism in many corners within.
A leader of a powerful member declares that the integration policies of its immigrants and new citizens failed fully (thus, spreading fear rather than hope), as the emerging far-right finds momentum to expand and to instrumentalize Turkey’s accession prospect as a political weapon to build a base against Islam, deliberately ignoring its democratic, civilian and European attributes.
It is apparent that the lack of decisive leadership will help revive the old ghosts of Europe, as the xenophobic, selfish, small-minded far-rightists from the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Bulgaria, etc., will push for a referendum in order to block Turkey altogether from the EU.
When the issue of direct trade (along with forgotten promise by the EU) with north Cyprus comes again to the discussion within the European Parliament (EP), the picture becomes even more worrisome. When the Legal Affairs Committee of the EP, giving in to massive Greek Cypriot pressure, decides against it, even the socialists choose to join the vote.
There is still (little) hope that it may be rejected by the Presidents’ Conference, but the real issue is the following: The mood, reflected by the vote, tells Turkey and Turkish Cypriots that the EU is now entirely controlled by a membership, whose desire is to pit the EU against the UN, in order to make the latter dysfunctional in reaching a settlement on the island.
Had the decision been reversed, it would have paved the way for Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot vessels and aircraft, and sped up both the negotiations for a solution on the island, and membership for Turkey in the union. The difference between the Europeans’ choice at the committee level is that simple.
The paradox is, it may add to the determination in Turkey to go further with the reform process, even if today’s profoundly confused EU may be even more stuck with its counterproductive Cyprus policies. In the end, who to blame for the historic folly will become much easier.
The fact of the matter is, Turkey, once labeled the “sick man of Europe” (not anywhere else, but Europe) has now managed to replace “sick” with “healthy,” and is seen with respect or envy by members under a huge burden of economic crisis.
Let me leave the word to the latest analysis of the Economist, whose recent, extremely sober article on Turkey is a devastating critique of an increasingly myopic continent.
“Negotiations (with the EU) have formally been going on for over five years. No country that has begun such talks has ever failed to be offered membership. But the leaders of France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands seem dead set against Turkish entry, as is much of their public opinion. The unresolved Cyprus dispute seems a near-insuperable roadblock. Yet if the EU chooses to exclude its own China, it will be turning away the fastest-growing economy in its neighborhood. It will also lose any hope of influencing the region to its east. At a time when many Europeans fret about being ignored in the world, this would be a historic mistake.
“ ... Turkey is heading in a good direction. It remains a shining (and rare) example in the Muslim world of a vibrant democracy with the rule of law and a thriving free-market economy. Much though Western leaders would like to turn the argument into one about Turkey, the real question is for them. Are Americans and Europeans prepared to accept Turkey for what it is: a Muslim democracy, with a different culture and diplomatic posture, but committed to economic and political liberalism? This newspaper hopes the answer is yes.”
It is an interesting type of development. In the first half of the now ending decade, what pushed Turkey ahead in terms of substantial change was the enormous dynamic of the prospect of membership in the union, and despite the quickly fading desire in Europe to accept its progress as an indication to speed up membership talks, Turkey accelerates its normalization nevertheless.
What is wrong then, and where? It is obvious that the main denominator for things having taken a negative turn is the lack of leadership within the EU. Its current state is of aimlessness, fatigue over political direction, shortsighted foreign policy and weakening coordination of economic management. What suffers most because of these factors is the enlargement policy.
What today’s Turkey -- as opposed to the Turkey of, say, 2002 -- sees in the EU of today is a picture of a destiny much less desired. As today’s Turkish society is more and more involved in a peaceful debate on the role of religion in politics and developing modalities over dealing fairly with diversity, etc., the old continent is sending out signals of increasing intolerance for its diversity and suffers from a growing extremism in many corners within.
A leader of a powerful member declares that the integration policies of its immigrants and new citizens failed fully (thus, spreading fear rather than hope), as the emerging far-right finds momentum to expand and to instrumentalize Turkey’s accession prospect as a political weapon to build a base against Islam, deliberately ignoring its democratic, civilian and European attributes.
It is apparent that the lack of decisive leadership will help revive the old ghosts of Europe, as the xenophobic, selfish, small-minded far-rightists from the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Bulgaria, etc., will push for a referendum in order to block Turkey altogether from the EU.
When the issue of direct trade (along with forgotten promise by the EU) with north Cyprus comes again to the discussion within the European Parliament (EP), the picture becomes even more worrisome. When the Legal Affairs Committee of the EP, giving in to massive Greek Cypriot pressure, decides against it, even the socialists choose to join the vote.
There is still (little) hope that it may be rejected by the Presidents’ Conference, but the real issue is the following: The mood, reflected by the vote, tells Turkey and Turkish Cypriots that the EU is now entirely controlled by a membership, whose desire is to pit the EU against the UN, in order to make the latter dysfunctional in reaching a settlement on the island.
Had the decision been reversed, it would have paved the way for Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot vessels and aircraft, and sped up both the negotiations for a solution on the island, and membership for Turkey in the union. The difference between the Europeans’ choice at the committee level is that simple.
The paradox is, it may add to the determination in Turkey to go further with the reform process, even if today’s profoundly confused EU may be even more stuck with its counterproductive Cyprus policies. In the end, who to blame for the historic folly will become much easier.
The fact of the matter is, Turkey, once labeled the “sick man of Europe” (not anywhere else, but Europe) has now managed to replace “sick” with “healthy,” and is seen with respect or envy by members under a huge burden of economic crisis.
Let me leave the word to the latest analysis of the Economist, whose recent, extremely sober article on Turkey is a devastating critique of an increasingly myopic continent.
“Negotiations (with the EU) have formally been going on for over five years. No country that has begun such talks has ever failed to be offered membership. But the leaders of France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands seem dead set against Turkish entry, as is much of their public opinion. The unresolved Cyprus dispute seems a near-insuperable roadblock. Yet if the EU chooses to exclude its own China, it will be turning away the fastest-growing economy in its neighborhood. It will also lose any hope of influencing the region to its east. At a time when many Europeans fret about being ignored in the world, this would be a historic mistake.
“ ... Turkey is heading in a good direction. It remains a shining (and rare) example in the Muslim world of a vibrant democracy with the rule of law and a thriving free-market economy. Much though Western leaders would like to turn the argument into one about Turkey, the real question is for them. Are Americans and Europeans prepared to accept Turkey for what it is: a Muslim democracy, with a different culture and diplomatic posture, but committed to economic and political liberalism? This newspaper hopes the answer is yes.”
Friday, October 22, 2010
The proof of the pudding
In the wake of the referendum, the inevitable is already fully visible. The result has paved the way for a new phase -- certainly promising ups, as well as downs -- in the democratization process. The inevitable is the fact that society is now involved in interpreting the meaning of the changes already launched.
Initial indications of the implementation of the new rules, the restructuring the Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), have been rather strongly expressed dissatisfaction at the outcome of the vote which elected 10 new members to the body. In an unprecedented format of democratic elections almost 12 thousand judges and prosecutors participated in the process.
Then all hell broke loose. Pundits in the media known for their pro-status quo stand cried foul, claiming that those who were elected -- with great margins in votes -- were all favored and endorsed by the Ministry of Justice. Some went even further to argue that the “separation of powers” was now in the coffin, ready to be buried.
These views may be severely polluted by exaggeration, but if dug deeply, they may have a point. The article concerning elections to HSYK in the original draft amendments -- as voted through Parliament -- was based on the principle of “pluralism” in the elections to the supreme body. Put simply, each judge or prosecutor would have the right to vote for names rather than lists. The Constitutional Court, going through the petition by the opposition later disagreed with this principle and made its own adjustments based on the principles of a “majority” system. The adjustment was harshly criticized by experts at that time and its possible dangers were exposed.
At the moment, remaining cautiously alarmist, this should be said: In practice it is almost impossible to control a full electorate of the judiciary and direct it to vote on a perceived “ministry list” -- the voters are far too complex in their leanings and positions to be able to be guided into a single line. Moreover, it is the first time such a democratic election has taken place and it can be compared to a dam breaking and a flood rushing in. It is known that prosecutors and judges in the country have suffered systematic suppression under the old caste system of the HSYK -- which acted like a judicial politburo -- and looked with contempt at the “old rulers.” It will take time before the waters calm down and a new internal balance is established.
Does this mean that the judiciary is now falling under the control of political executives? It is a brand new situation and as with any transitional democracy, it must be strictly monitored by its practices. Any strict judgment now would be premature.
As the saying goes, “The proof of the pudding is in the eating.” Extreme alarmism should be taken with caution, since democracy -- as proven in any part of the world -- is a fluid process, which must be kept open to new problems and their solutions.
We are somewhere between panic and calm. On another front, in the wake of a directive by the Supreme Board of Universities (YÖK), the chronic search for the freedom of the wearing of the headscarf on university campuses continues -- and polarization on the issue shows no signs of abating. On Wednesday some Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputies met with the three opposing parties to explore whether or not there would be a consensus. Merely an hour later, the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals appeared on the scene again -- after a couple of years -- with a new threat. Declaring the wearing of the headscarf at universities to be “illegal” -- thus putting the YÖK directorate into question -- he warned that any party involved in policymaking on the issue would face “consequences” (read “closure”). The AK Party and the Speaker responded harshly, demanding an apology for intervening in “affairs of the legislative body.”
This is bound to heat up the debate.
It is clear that the high judiciary is keen to resume the fight from where it left off. If the parties (against all odds) decide to pursue the issue, the chief prosecutor knows he has very little chance of success with the new expanded 17-member Constitutional Court. With this old pattern of behavior, he would only succeed in victimizing the AK Party on the eve of new elections, thus putting the opposition in an even more precarious position.
If the move by the chief prosecutor is an outcome of a new escalation, one may expect the top command to declare soon that it is refraining from joining the Republic Day reception on Oct. 29, in which the First Lady will welcome guests while wearing her headscarf, putting an end to a practice of absence in prior years.
The remnants of the tutelage have -- sadly -- not yet learned the lesson of letting civilian politics alone to find their democratic balance.
Initial indications of the implementation of the new rules, the restructuring the Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), have been rather strongly expressed dissatisfaction at the outcome of the vote which elected 10 new members to the body. In an unprecedented format of democratic elections almost 12 thousand judges and prosecutors participated in the process.
Then all hell broke loose. Pundits in the media known for their pro-status quo stand cried foul, claiming that those who were elected -- with great margins in votes -- were all favored and endorsed by the Ministry of Justice. Some went even further to argue that the “separation of powers” was now in the coffin, ready to be buried.
These views may be severely polluted by exaggeration, but if dug deeply, they may have a point. The article concerning elections to HSYK in the original draft amendments -- as voted through Parliament -- was based on the principle of “pluralism” in the elections to the supreme body. Put simply, each judge or prosecutor would have the right to vote for names rather than lists. The Constitutional Court, going through the petition by the opposition later disagreed with this principle and made its own adjustments based on the principles of a “majority” system. The adjustment was harshly criticized by experts at that time and its possible dangers were exposed.
At the moment, remaining cautiously alarmist, this should be said: In practice it is almost impossible to control a full electorate of the judiciary and direct it to vote on a perceived “ministry list” -- the voters are far too complex in their leanings and positions to be able to be guided into a single line. Moreover, it is the first time such a democratic election has taken place and it can be compared to a dam breaking and a flood rushing in. It is known that prosecutors and judges in the country have suffered systematic suppression under the old caste system of the HSYK -- which acted like a judicial politburo -- and looked with contempt at the “old rulers.” It will take time before the waters calm down and a new internal balance is established.
Does this mean that the judiciary is now falling under the control of political executives? It is a brand new situation and as with any transitional democracy, it must be strictly monitored by its practices. Any strict judgment now would be premature.
As the saying goes, “The proof of the pudding is in the eating.” Extreme alarmism should be taken with caution, since democracy -- as proven in any part of the world -- is a fluid process, which must be kept open to new problems and their solutions.
We are somewhere between panic and calm. On another front, in the wake of a directive by the Supreme Board of Universities (YÖK), the chronic search for the freedom of the wearing of the headscarf on university campuses continues -- and polarization on the issue shows no signs of abating. On Wednesday some Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputies met with the three opposing parties to explore whether or not there would be a consensus. Merely an hour later, the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals appeared on the scene again -- after a couple of years -- with a new threat. Declaring the wearing of the headscarf at universities to be “illegal” -- thus putting the YÖK directorate into question -- he warned that any party involved in policymaking on the issue would face “consequences” (read “closure”). The AK Party and the Speaker responded harshly, demanding an apology for intervening in “affairs of the legislative body.”
This is bound to heat up the debate.
It is clear that the high judiciary is keen to resume the fight from where it left off. If the parties (against all odds) decide to pursue the issue, the chief prosecutor knows he has very little chance of success with the new expanded 17-member Constitutional Court. With this old pattern of behavior, he would only succeed in victimizing the AK Party on the eve of new elections, thus putting the opposition in an even more precarious position.
If the move by the chief prosecutor is an outcome of a new escalation, one may expect the top command to declare soon that it is refraining from joining the Republic Day reception on Oct. 29, in which the First Lady will welcome guests while wearing her headscarf, putting an end to a practice of absence in prior years.
The remnants of the tutelage have -- sadly -- not yet learned the lesson of letting civilian politics alone to find their democratic balance.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Greece misreads the new reality
The other night I met with some old friends from Athens. Some of them are linked with the ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and keen followers of Turkey’s reshaping foreign policy. For years they have been sincerely engaged in overcoming obstacles which have made Greek-Turkish relations problematic in many areas.
The main topic of the conversation was -- inevitably -- Cyprus. They asked me, in a concerned tone, whether Ankara would take new steps to help speed up the process. They meant, naturally, opening Turkey’s air and seaports to Greek Cypriot aircraft and vessels. Because, the argument went on, Turkey could not be a credible regional power if it went on denying these steps. And, of course, it will put the entire accession process for EU membership into jeopardy.
The question and the related argument is not new. They were based on the regular presumption that Turkey is as keen as, say, five years ago, to hurry into full membership. They were rather outdated in their formulations: They displayed a simple equation between the implementation of the Ankara Protocol and a possible cheering within the EU to open up the gates to full membership with immediate effect. Last, they were had a lack of a fresh reading into what sort of shape Ankara has already been taking in today’s foreign policy.
I may have provoked my dear friends with my direct responses. I countered that EU membership in the minds of the people here has lost much of its glamour and support has now fallen to around 40 percent. What the common man and woman on the street generally believe is that their country is misunderstood or ignored fully because of a failure by Europeans to understand the meaning of changes and the objectives maintained for democratization. The fatigue is endorsed by the continued economic success here, and the turbulence in financial management of the union. People here see a Europe with no bold and visionary leadership, with increasing xenophobia, with a worrisome contempt for Islam and chronic myopia in its foreign policy.
The notion that keeps developing here is the “Turkey does not belong in Europe, let us resist membership fully” motto among some political actors and segments of European society that is now turning into an obsession. The open tolerance for anti-Turkey and anti-Turkish sentiments, often bordering on archaic acts of racism (in member countries such as the Netherlands and Bulgaria), automatically awakens similar sentiments in this country as well.
So, I suggested to my Greek friends that they should adopt new ways of thinking. The more prosperous and self-confident Turkey is -- as seems to be case now -- the more independently it will reason and act. Can Turkey live with the Cyprus problem for a long time? Yes, it can. The wealthier it is, the easier it can finance North Cyprus.
Yes, but what about EU negotiations and how will it affect security in the Eastern Mediterranean? It is Ankara’s policy to sit at the EU table and support the Turkish Cypriot position. In no case, the towels will have to be thrown in.
If a solution to the conflict and regional security are in the interests of Greece and Cyprus, it should be for the whole union as well. So, if this premise is logical, hitting the ball in Turkey’s court and expecting other sides to do nothing is old thinking. The correct question to be asked is, “What can we do that we have not done so far?”
There are two crucial, principal points for reflection: First, the EU must stop approaching Ankara, acting “undecided” about the prospect of full membership. Mixed messages, often aimed at domestic consumption, but also based on extreme prejudice, only make the Turkey-EU dialogue worse. Alienating Turkey and its people will have far-reaching consequences; it will not add to the strength of the EU.
The second has to do with the role of Greece in the Cyprus issue. Ever since Cyprus became -- with its chronic problems -- a full member of the EU, Athens has barely done anything to encourage Nicosia to work constructively toward a solution. It stood in the background saying: “This is their problem. They must solve it.” This was an act of hypocrisy because Athens archaically believed that the appetite for EU membership would lead Ankara to make unilateral concessions. But Ankara has shown that outside engagement can change parameters: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government boldly made Rauf Denktaş leave his post to Mehmet Ali Talat in 2004. It showed that when “main lands” become involved, the process can raise hopes.
It is time for Athens to stop the hypocrisy and adopt a new language. It is much weaker on the position to dictate conditions for Turkey. Greece, as is well known, does not enjoy a positive reputation within the bloc at the moment. Because of its tremendous economic mismanagement that threatens the EU, it has an issue of profound mistrust.
One way of repairing its image could easily be through engagement in Cyprus. Lifting the embargo on the North and opening of the ports must be in synch. The more in cooperation and pragmatic Athens and Ankara are on the issue, the stronger the prospects for regional security and a settlement on the island. Then they can make sure that it is understood clearly within the confused and prejudiced EU circles.
The main topic of the conversation was -- inevitably -- Cyprus. They asked me, in a concerned tone, whether Ankara would take new steps to help speed up the process. They meant, naturally, opening Turkey’s air and seaports to Greek Cypriot aircraft and vessels. Because, the argument went on, Turkey could not be a credible regional power if it went on denying these steps. And, of course, it will put the entire accession process for EU membership into jeopardy.
The question and the related argument is not new. They were based on the regular presumption that Turkey is as keen as, say, five years ago, to hurry into full membership. They were rather outdated in their formulations: They displayed a simple equation between the implementation of the Ankara Protocol and a possible cheering within the EU to open up the gates to full membership with immediate effect. Last, they were had a lack of a fresh reading into what sort of shape Ankara has already been taking in today’s foreign policy.
I may have provoked my dear friends with my direct responses. I countered that EU membership in the minds of the people here has lost much of its glamour and support has now fallen to around 40 percent. What the common man and woman on the street generally believe is that their country is misunderstood or ignored fully because of a failure by Europeans to understand the meaning of changes and the objectives maintained for democratization. The fatigue is endorsed by the continued economic success here, and the turbulence in financial management of the union. People here see a Europe with no bold and visionary leadership, with increasing xenophobia, with a worrisome contempt for Islam and chronic myopia in its foreign policy.
The notion that keeps developing here is the “Turkey does not belong in Europe, let us resist membership fully” motto among some political actors and segments of European society that is now turning into an obsession. The open tolerance for anti-Turkey and anti-Turkish sentiments, often bordering on archaic acts of racism (in member countries such as the Netherlands and Bulgaria), automatically awakens similar sentiments in this country as well.
So, I suggested to my Greek friends that they should adopt new ways of thinking. The more prosperous and self-confident Turkey is -- as seems to be case now -- the more independently it will reason and act. Can Turkey live with the Cyprus problem for a long time? Yes, it can. The wealthier it is, the easier it can finance North Cyprus.
Yes, but what about EU negotiations and how will it affect security in the Eastern Mediterranean? It is Ankara’s policy to sit at the EU table and support the Turkish Cypriot position. In no case, the towels will have to be thrown in.
If a solution to the conflict and regional security are in the interests of Greece and Cyprus, it should be for the whole union as well. So, if this premise is logical, hitting the ball in Turkey’s court and expecting other sides to do nothing is old thinking. The correct question to be asked is, “What can we do that we have not done so far?”
There are two crucial, principal points for reflection: First, the EU must stop approaching Ankara, acting “undecided” about the prospect of full membership. Mixed messages, often aimed at domestic consumption, but also based on extreme prejudice, only make the Turkey-EU dialogue worse. Alienating Turkey and its people will have far-reaching consequences; it will not add to the strength of the EU.
The second has to do with the role of Greece in the Cyprus issue. Ever since Cyprus became -- with its chronic problems -- a full member of the EU, Athens has barely done anything to encourage Nicosia to work constructively toward a solution. It stood in the background saying: “This is their problem. They must solve it.” This was an act of hypocrisy because Athens archaically believed that the appetite for EU membership would lead Ankara to make unilateral concessions. But Ankara has shown that outside engagement can change parameters: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government boldly made Rauf Denktaş leave his post to Mehmet Ali Talat in 2004. It showed that when “main lands” become involved, the process can raise hopes.
It is time for Athens to stop the hypocrisy and adopt a new language. It is much weaker on the position to dictate conditions for Turkey. Greece, as is well known, does not enjoy a positive reputation within the bloc at the moment. Because of its tremendous economic mismanagement that threatens the EU, it has an issue of profound mistrust.
One way of repairing its image could easily be through engagement in Cyprus. Lifting the embargo on the North and opening of the ports must be in synch. The more in cooperation and pragmatic Athens and Ankara are on the issue, the stronger the prospects for regional security and a settlement on the island. Then they can make sure that it is understood clearly within the confused and prejudiced EU circles.
Disturbing legacy of murder culture
Summarizing the past 30 years in Turkey would be devoid of context if one ignored the pattern of murders that cut right across it like a thread of damnation. During the period 1980 to 1983 under the strict and ruthless rule of generals, the entire register of crimes against humanity were committed – such as hangings of militants of the right or left, mass torture and summary executions – all legitimate under the coup regime.
From approximately 1987 onwards, up until the start of the Ergenekon trial and other trials in 2007 involving civilians or the military, the narrative is dominated by incidents whose backgrounds are (kept) in darkness.
It should therefore come as no surprise that the notorious “old stories” of that period never age. The demand for truth about the past haunts today and tomorrow. When Semra Özal and her son Ahmet insist Turgut Özal was murdered by poisoning while on duty, almost nobody is shocked. The period in question had that characteristic -- nobody, including even the highest placed people, felt safe.
Feeling increasingly encouraged, the various actors of those times now come forward and fuel more suspicion, challenging those who did not believe in the role of conspiracy to influence the direction of the -- then unstable -- country.
If Özal was murdered, as claimed, then it was a successful end to a series of attempts to do so. Already in 1988, an apparently hired gun had tried to shoot him down in an indoor political meeting organized by his Motherland Party (ANAP). The case remains unresolved today, as well as hundreds of others involving all sorts of people in politics, academia, media and bureaucracy.
One of the actors who now steps forward is Feyzi İşbaşaran, currently an independent deputy, who was Özal’s private secretary at the time of the attempted murder. In an interview with the Sabah daily, he said that a team Özal had gathered solved the murder attempt and “identified some names with certainty” behind gunman Kartal Demirağ. He said four people helped him, adding that when Özal was told the identities, “he was shocked.”
When they were ready to act, İşbaşaran said, some people from within ANAP warned Özal and his team: “Leave this case alone.” At that time, Özal was prime minister and was planning to take over the presidency soon, so he let it be covered up. İşbaşaran quoted Özal as telling his team, “If we take this challenge, the country will end up losing. I operate under constant threat. Those who did this know that we have found out the truth. They fear that with 292 deputies (a majority) we will change the constitution. But knowing that we know (about the attempt) they will not dare again.”
But they did, in April 1993, if we believe his family. His wife insists that he was given a liquid at a reception in Ankara, and she felt sure of “something gravely wrong” when she witnessed her husband’s last moments. She disputes the claims of current Deputy Chief of General Staff Aslan Güner, who then was Özal’s adjutant, who says Özal was driven swiftly to the hospital. She claims that he was deliberately “driven around” Ankara’s streets to waste time.
While the period 1988 - 1992 was filled with murders of state dignitaries, officers, and some prominent academicians of the “republican camp,” the year 1993 symbolizes in the eyes of many keen observers of late Turkish history, a peak in events that not only marked patterns of social trauma but also signaled a policy change in tightening the screws of tutelage over the government.
In the course of less than 11 months in that year, murder followed murder. In January, prominent investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu was targeted by a car bomb in Ankara. A couple of weeks later, Adnan Kahveci, one of Özal’s most trusted aides, was killed in a mysterious car accident with his family. He was the author of an internal report on the Kurdish issue. Soon after, Eşref Bitlis, then Commander of the Gendarmerie, was killed in an airplane crash -- another event still surrounded by deep suspicion. (Bitlis was very close to Özal and outspoken about a “civilian solution” to the Kurdish issue.)
Shortly after Özal’s unexpected death, 33 soldiers were executed in an act attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which even shocked Abdullah Öcalan, its leader. In the summer of that year, 37 intellectual Alawites were burned to death by a mob -- an apparent act of arson to a hotel in Sivas. Again, soon after this, an attack in a village near Erzincan ended in a massacre of 33 peasants.
So on and so forth.
Given the memories, kept fresh because little has been done to seek the truth behind all of these, its not hard to understand the nature of cases like Ergenekon and those launched in the southeastern towns; moreover, it points to the vital importance of keeping pressure on the government and the judiciary to “go to the very end, wherever it might lead.” İşbaşaran argues that if one begins with the assassination attempt in 1988, “the rest will follow in a series of flashes of truth,” since they are, he implies, interconnected. He might be right.
From approximately 1987 onwards, up until the start of the Ergenekon trial and other trials in 2007 involving civilians or the military, the narrative is dominated by incidents whose backgrounds are (kept) in darkness.
It should therefore come as no surprise that the notorious “old stories” of that period never age. The demand for truth about the past haunts today and tomorrow. When Semra Özal and her son Ahmet insist Turgut Özal was murdered by poisoning while on duty, almost nobody is shocked. The period in question had that characteristic -- nobody, including even the highest placed people, felt safe.
Feeling increasingly encouraged, the various actors of those times now come forward and fuel more suspicion, challenging those who did not believe in the role of conspiracy to influence the direction of the -- then unstable -- country.
If Özal was murdered, as claimed, then it was a successful end to a series of attempts to do so. Already in 1988, an apparently hired gun had tried to shoot him down in an indoor political meeting organized by his Motherland Party (ANAP). The case remains unresolved today, as well as hundreds of others involving all sorts of people in politics, academia, media and bureaucracy.
One of the actors who now steps forward is Feyzi İşbaşaran, currently an independent deputy, who was Özal’s private secretary at the time of the attempted murder. In an interview with the Sabah daily, he said that a team Özal had gathered solved the murder attempt and “identified some names with certainty” behind gunman Kartal Demirağ. He said four people helped him, adding that when Özal was told the identities, “he was shocked.”
When they were ready to act, İşbaşaran said, some people from within ANAP warned Özal and his team: “Leave this case alone.” At that time, Özal was prime minister and was planning to take over the presidency soon, so he let it be covered up. İşbaşaran quoted Özal as telling his team, “If we take this challenge, the country will end up losing. I operate under constant threat. Those who did this know that we have found out the truth. They fear that with 292 deputies (a majority) we will change the constitution. But knowing that we know (about the attempt) they will not dare again.”
But they did, in April 1993, if we believe his family. His wife insists that he was given a liquid at a reception in Ankara, and she felt sure of “something gravely wrong” when she witnessed her husband’s last moments. She disputes the claims of current Deputy Chief of General Staff Aslan Güner, who then was Özal’s adjutant, who says Özal was driven swiftly to the hospital. She claims that he was deliberately “driven around” Ankara’s streets to waste time.
While the period 1988 - 1992 was filled with murders of state dignitaries, officers, and some prominent academicians of the “republican camp,” the year 1993 symbolizes in the eyes of many keen observers of late Turkish history, a peak in events that not only marked patterns of social trauma but also signaled a policy change in tightening the screws of tutelage over the government.
In the course of less than 11 months in that year, murder followed murder. In January, prominent investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu was targeted by a car bomb in Ankara. A couple of weeks later, Adnan Kahveci, one of Özal’s most trusted aides, was killed in a mysterious car accident with his family. He was the author of an internal report on the Kurdish issue. Soon after, Eşref Bitlis, then Commander of the Gendarmerie, was killed in an airplane crash -- another event still surrounded by deep suspicion. (Bitlis was very close to Özal and outspoken about a “civilian solution” to the Kurdish issue.)
Shortly after Özal’s unexpected death, 33 soldiers were executed in an act attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which even shocked Abdullah Öcalan, its leader. In the summer of that year, 37 intellectual Alawites were burned to death by a mob -- an apparent act of arson to a hotel in Sivas. Again, soon after this, an attack in a village near Erzincan ended in a massacre of 33 peasants.
So on and so forth.
Given the memories, kept fresh because little has been done to seek the truth behind all of these, its not hard to understand the nature of cases like Ergenekon and those launched in the southeastern towns; moreover, it points to the vital importance of keeping pressure on the government and the judiciary to “go to the very end, wherever it might lead.” İşbaşaran argues that if one begins with the assassination attempt in 1988, “the rest will follow in a series of flashes of truth,” since they are, he implies, interconnected. He might be right.
Journalists in jail
Noam Chomsky, who visited İstanbul to take part in a conference on freedom of expression, summarized the situation in a calm manner. He told the press that from 2002 to 2008 observers of Turkey had noted with satisfaction that freedom of expression thrived and that journalism and debate became much bolder, but that in the last couple of years the situation had again become alarming.
He is right. We have reason to worry because as discontent among our colleagues grows, so does the insensitivity of the authorities, both political and judiciary.
A severely disturbing indicator of worsening conditions for journalists is the number of those in jail, and the escalation in cases filed against them. In more than 3,000 cases, newspapers and reporters are being subjected to legal inquiries, and more than 2,500 indictments have now been filed against them.
The Taraf and Zaman dailies top the list of these files. Taraf recently broke the national record as a newspaper that was tried in 44 separate cases in just one day. It has 285 cases hanging over its head.
But the record of ongoing cases goes to Zaman. Prosecutors filed more than 550 cases against the newspaper. The Star daily, “number two” on the list, has also been shaken by 407 cases. Others are also being affected, including Radikal and Milliyet.
An overwhelming majority of those cases have the core of journalism as a target: Prosecutors ground their accusations on “national security,” “breach of the secrecy of legal investigations,” “criticism of the courts,” “revealing secret documents,” “exposing authority figures as targets for terrorist organizations,” etc. In some cases, it is prosecutors with expanded jurisdiction, and not the so-called prosecutors responsible for “violations in the press,” who act. It is a clear indicator of what direction the “respect for press freedom” is going in.
How many journalists are in jail? This is a tricky question and one that divides those who monitor the state of journalism in Turkey. It has to do with the criteria with which each arrest, detention and sentencing is judged, whether or not the cause for legal action has to do with the professional practice of the journalist.
Arguably, the most reliable source for this is the Independent Communications Network (Bianet), which has for years systematically monitored media freedom indicators along universal norms. According to Bianet, four journalists were in jail as of late August. The network recently added a fifth name to the list. Four of them are editors of Kurdish publications while the fifth is Erdal Güler, the editor of the Devrimci Demokrasi periodical.
We have two other sources. One is the Solidarity Platform for Detained Journalists (TGDP), which claims that the number is 40. The other is the International Press Institute’s (IPI) Turkey branch, which insists that there are 48 journalists in jail. These are less reliable, simply because they are not as meticulous as Bianet, which receives the powerful assistance of lawyers and observers. The TGDP includes in its count all cases filed under “terrorist actions,” where it is very difficult to distinguish whether or not a certain publisher is detained due to their professional work or not. (That is also the reason why many prominent journalists disagree that journalists such as Mustafa Balbay, Tuncay Özkan and Ergun Poyraz are to be campaigned for. They are detained under the Ergenekon case for their work. It is a symbolic problem of defining where the criteria end.)
The IPI’s problem is consistency and bias. The organization, which had displayed remarkable insensitivity in the hugely problematic 1990s, particularly to the “severe” cases of the Kurdish and pro-Islamist press, is now -- mainly because of its affiliation with the Doğan Media Group -- keen on being seen as the champion of press freedom.
Apart from serious sources such as Bianet, other figures must be taken with a pinch of salt. But this does not by any means minimize the seriousness of the situation. Something has to be done.
The problem with the Turkish press today is also the press itself. It is severely divided; due to internal fights and ideological differences, it acts on selectivity. While ignoring completely what happens on, say, the “Kurdish press,” it chooses to blow out of proportion cases in its own “camp.” There is no longer a common ground on which to fight the cause for the profession, and this much is tragic.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently said preparations were being made to “review” laws and articles that curb freedoms. The ball, as with many other things, is in the government’s court. Many laws indeed need changing, including the Internet Law. Hoping, however, will not be enough; concrete steps need to be taken.
He is right. We have reason to worry because as discontent among our colleagues grows, so does the insensitivity of the authorities, both political and judiciary.
A severely disturbing indicator of worsening conditions for journalists is the number of those in jail, and the escalation in cases filed against them. In more than 3,000 cases, newspapers and reporters are being subjected to legal inquiries, and more than 2,500 indictments have now been filed against them.
The Taraf and Zaman dailies top the list of these files. Taraf recently broke the national record as a newspaper that was tried in 44 separate cases in just one day. It has 285 cases hanging over its head.
But the record of ongoing cases goes to Zaman. Prosecutors filed more than 550 cases against the newspaper. The Star daily, “number two” on the list, has also been shaken by 407 cases. Others are also being affected, including Radikal and Milliyet.
An overwhelming majority of those cases have the core of journalism as a target: Prosecutors ground their accusations on “national security,” “breach of the secrecy of legal investigations,” “criticism of the courts,” “revealing secret documents,” “exposing authority figures as targets for terrorist organizations,” etc. In some cases, it is prosecutors with expanded jurisdiction, and not the so-called prosecutors responsible for “violations in the press,” who act. It is a clear indicator of what direction the “respect for press freedom” is going in.
How many journalists are in jail? This is a tricky question and one that divides those who monitor the state of journalism in Turkey. It has to do with the criteria with which each arrest, detention and sentencing is judged, whether or not the cause for legal action has to do with the professional practice of the journalist.
Arguably, the most reliable source for this is the Independent Communications Network (Bianet), which has for years systematically monitored media freedom indicators along universal norms. According to Bianet, four journalists were in jail as of late August. The network recently added a fifth name to the list. Four of them are editors of Kurdish publications while the fifth is Erdal Güler, the editor of the Devrimci Demokrasi periodical.
We have two other sources. One is the Solidarity Platform for Detained Journalists (TGDP), which claims that the number is 40. The other is the International Press Institute’s (IPI) Turkey branch, which insists that there are 48 journalists in jail. These are less reliable, simply because they are not as meticulous as Bianet, which receives the powerful assistance of lawyers and observers. The TGDP includes in its count all cases filed under “terrorist actions,” where it is very difficult to distinguish whether or not a certain publisher is detained due to their professional work or not. (That is also the reason why many prominent journalists disagree that journalists such as Mustafa Balbay, Tuncay Özkan and Ergun Poyraz are to be campaigned for. They are detained under the Ergenekon case for their work. It is a symbolic problem of defining where the criteria end.)
The IPI’s problem is consistency and bias. The organization, which had displayed remarkable insensitivity in the hugely problematic 1990s, particularly to the “severe” cases of the Kurdish and pro-Islamist press, is now -- mainly because of its affiliation with the Doğan Media Group -- keen on being seen as the champion of press freedom.
Apart from serious sources such as Bianet, other figures must be taken with a pinch of salt. But this does not by any means minimize the seriousness of the situation. Something has to be done.
The problem with the Turkish press today is also the press itself. It is severely divided; due to internal fights and ideological differences, it acts on selectivity. While ignoring completely what happens on, say, the “Kurdish press,” it chooses to blow out of proportion cases in its own “camp.” There is no longer a common ground on which to fight the cause for the profession, and this much is tragic.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently said preparations were being made to “review” laws and articles that curb freedoms. The ball, as with many other things, is in the government’s court. Many laws indeed need changing, including the Internet Law. Hoping, however, will not be enough; concrete steps need to be taken.
Refocusing on press freedom
In his analysis on Monday, Ömer Taşpınar highlighted two main points on how Turkey in the post-referendum period is perceived in the US capital. The positive part is, Taşpınar wrote, that there is no doubt across the ocean that Turkey is consolidating its democracy by a resounding “yes.”
But, he underlined, “There is a perception among important segments of the US punditry and more importantly the US government that the [Justice and Development Party] AK Party is becoming more authoritarian. The reason for this perception is primarily the tax penalty exerted on the Doğan Media Group.”
He went on: “It was a bad idea to exert such a heavy and irrational tax penalty on the Doğan Media Group. In addition to the ethical problem and the ‘freedom of the press’ dimension of the penalty, it was also bad politics, mainly because this tax penalty constantly overshadows democratic developments in Turkey. The penalty allows the Doğan group to argue that media freedom had never been more endangered in Turkish history. Such exaggerated allegations are of course baseless and false but they still resonate in Washington because of the pervasive negative image of the AK Party.”
I read Ömer’s column as I entered a meeting with prominent colleagues representing a wide range of Turkish media to discuss “Media, Democratization and Self-Regulation in Turkey” under the auspices of UNESCO, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Present were outlets such as Hürriyet, Sabah, ATV, NTV and some voluntary “media watch” organizations.
After intense and profoundly frank talks, I decided to comment on US perceptions on the “Turkey and press freedom” issue, revisiting some key points, which obviously misled some segments in Washington, D.C., either due to severe exaggerations, as Ömer emphasized, or spin.
Let us begin with a fresh and developing story. Bekir Coşkun, an outspoken and very popular columnist, was fired on Monday from the Habertürk daily, a newspaper owned by the Ciner Group. Coşkun told Internet news sites that he was fired because of “his opposition to the government.”
A couple of weeks ago another columnist, also known for her ultra-secularist views, was shown the door. Mine Kırıkkanat, an (ex-)columnist with the Vatan daily wrote that the motive was political. Her editor claimed in a letter to her that what she wrote was “unethical.”
Kırıkkanat had called for not sending any aid at all to Pakistan’s flood victims, implying that they as Muslims did not deserve that.
It is very simple to deduce that in both cases the owners decided to fire them, not the government.
Is it that easy to fire people working for news outlets? It happens almost every day. The very media owners who act this way are the ones who dismantled every trade union structure from their media companies, leaving job security constantly vulnerable in Turkey.
It is no wonder, then, that all my colleagues within such outlets put the blame entirely on the government, pushing forward the argument that “press freedom is in danger,” simply because they have been stripped of their right to unionize and do not dare raise their voices in unity against the owners.
The very fact that not even a single journalist with a conscience has declared his or her solidarity with big media conglomerates and their owners is telling enough: Ownership structures and abuses of journalists’ integrity exercised by media moguls are remembered with experiences of pain and harassment in the collective professional memory.
The simplistic view among American pundits and power circles, based on raw linkages between punitive measures on media and its freedom, must be nuanced, because it perpetuates chronic and fundamental problems in Turkey’s troubled and bruised media sector.
Those who cling to the view on Doğan tax evasion case must first clarify: Are they concerned because a media company has become a target of tax scrutiny or because the penalty figures are too high? This is not clear. Nor enough.
The fundamental problem has to do with the behavior of media proprietors. As experience shows, the same criteria for “quality” do not apply to, say, an owner of an energy company and a media company. The latter works mainly on principles and trust, and for this it needs something called editorial independence.
Those who draw an equation between tax evasion and press freedom must talk to the entire press corps of Turkey, including a vocal critique of the government, Emin Çölaşan, who wrote a book about his experiences in a censoring corporate culture.
They must also solve the following puzzle: If the press freedom is really in danger, how come a newspaper like “Sözcü”, a ruthless oppositionalş paper, not only survives but also constantly increases its circulation.
If they do, they will find the right way:
The path to press freedom will be opened if the government in Ankara regulates the shares in media property area, blocks loopholes to monopolization, bans cross ownership, stops by law media owners entering public tenders and passes the Trade Unions’ Law in the parliament.
This is the logical way to create a diverse, more independent and free press that competes freely, and invalidates cheap arguments based on corporate self-interest.
But, he underlined, “There is a perception among important segments of the US punditry and more importantly the US government that the [Justice and Development Party] AK Party is becoming more authoritarian. The reason for this perception is primarily the tax penalty exerted on the Doğan Media Group.”
He went on: “It was a bad idea to exert such a heavy and irrational tax penalty on the Doğan Media Group. In addition to the ethical problem and the ‘freedom of the press’ dimension of the penalty, it was also bad politics, mainly because this tax penalty constantly overshadows democratic developments in Turkey. The penalty allows the Doğan group to argue that media freedom had never been more endangered in Turkish history. Such exaggerated allegations are of course baseless and false but they still resonate in Washington because of the pervasive negative image of the AK Party.”
I read Ömer’s column as I entered a meeting with prominent colleagues representing a wide range of Turkish media to discuss “Media, Democratization and Self-Regulation in Turkey” under the auspices of UNESCO, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Present were outlets such as Hürriyet, Sabah, ATV, NTV and some voluntary “media watch” organizations.
After intense and profoundly frank talks, I decided to comment on US perceptions on the “Turkey and press freedom” issue, revisiting some key points, which obviously misled some segments in Washington, D.C., either due to severe exaggerations, as Ömer emphasized, or spin.
Let us begin with a fresh and developing story. Bekir Coşkun, an outspoken and very popular columnist, was fired on Monday from the Habertürk daily, a newspaper owned by the Ciner Group. Coşkun told Internet news sites that he was fired because of “his opposition to the government.”
A couple of weeks ago another columnist, also known for her ultra-secularist views, was shown the door. Mine Kırıkkanat, an (ex-)columnist with the Vatan daily wrote that the motive was political. Her editor claimed in a letter to her that what she wrote was “unethical.”
Kırıkkanat had called for not sending any aid at all to Pakistan’s flood victims, implying that they as Muslims did not deserve that.
It is very simple to deduce that in both cases the owners decided to fire them, not the government.
Is it that easy to fire people working for news outlets? It happens almost every day. The very media owners who act this way are the ones who dismantled every trade union structure from their media companies, leaving job security constantly vulnerable in Turkey.
It is no wonder, then, that all my colleagues within such outlets put the blame entirely on the government, pushing forward the argument that “press freedom is in danger,” simply because they have been stripped of their right to unionize and do not dare raise their voices in unity against the owners.
The very fact that not even a single journalist with a conscience has declared his or her solidarity with big media conglomerates and their owners is telling enough: Ownership structures and abuses of journalists’ integrity exercised by media moguls are remembered with experiences of pain and harassment in the collective professional memory.
The simplistic view among American pundits and power circles, based on raw linkages between punitive measures on media and its freedom, must be nuanced, because it perpetuates chronic and fundamental problems in Turkey’s troubled and bruised media sector.
Those who cling to the view on Doğan tax evasion case must first clarify: Are they concerned because a media company has become a target of tax scrutiny or because the penalty figures are too high? This is not clear. Nor enough.
The fundamental problem has to do with the behavior of media proprietors. As experience shows, the same criteria for “quality” do not apply to, say, an owner of an energy company and a media company. The latter works mainly on principles and trust, and for this it needs something called editorial independence.
Those who draw an equation between tax evasion and press freedom must talk to the entire press corps of Turkey, including a vocal critique of the government, Emin Çölaşan, who wrote a book about his experiences in a censoring corporate culture.
They must also solve the following puzzle: If the press freedom is really in danger, how come a newspaper like “Sözcü”, a ruthless oppositionalş paper, not only survives but also constantly increases its circulation.
If they do, they will find the right way:
The path to press freedom will be opened if the government in Ankara regulates the shares in media property area, blocks loopholes to monopolization, bans cross ownership, stops by law media owners entering public tenders and passes the Trade Unions’ Law in the parliament.
This is the logical way to create a diverse, more independent and free press that competes freely, and invalidates cheap arguments based on corporate self-interest.
With or without a cross
The plane was just one of the dozen or more that flew to the eastern city of Van. It was early Saturday morning, and in the aircraft, a buzzing mixture of people: Turks, Kurds, Armenians, journalists, priests and academics.
The Armenians, the majority of the passengers, came from various corners of the world. Some had flown by night flights via İstanbul or Vienna, reaching here from Armenia proper. The air was of a meet and greet, and talk came easily.
I met an old friend, from the Armenian community in İstanbul. I had not seen her for a long time. She was visibly sad when she saw me. “He should have been with us, now,” she said. The missing person was our mutual friend, the patriarch of İstanbul, Mesrob II, who has been gravely ill, incommunicado for months. “It was his dream,” she said, with tears in her eyes.
Indeed. I had first heard about the miserable state of the Church of the Holy Cross, known as Akdamar, from him years and years ago. He wanted it to be restored and opened for prayers, as much as he wanted the tiny, historic Silk Road bridge between Kars province and Armenia rebuilt. Both as symbolic gestures, small in size, but huge in impact, and to accelerate reconciliation and peace.
Thanks to efforts from various sides and institutions, and after a series of hurdles, Van finally witnessed an historic event. A thousand years of history has seen again the light of today, and the Armenians, sharers of these lands with others, were in tears while praying on the island, after a horrid period of darkness, for memory and forgiveness. It was more than a little step, to say the least.
The people of Van had anticipated with great excitement the idea that people would visit their city in great numbers, taking the event as a pretext, and experience their well-known hospitality. Fewer than expected arrived, mainly due to problems with the preparation work concerning the cross.
Overall, the restoration attracted praise. The work conducted inside and outside the church was meticulous. However, when it came to the cross, it was a complicated story.
“Well, my brother, what can I say? It is a church, so it should have a cross, is that correct? Can a church be complete without it? No!” Zahir Kandaşoğlu, the dynamic chairman of Van Chamber of Trade and Commerce, and a prominent figure from one of the province’s most powerful Kurdish tribes, reacts with open frustration that the cross could not be placed on top of the building for the ceremony. He is the driving force for opening the Armenian border, only two-and-a-half hours away, and he tells me funny stories about how the local Kurds changed their minds in favor of restoring the Armenian heritage, realizing how important it is for Van to open up to the world. “Before, those Kurds out there would refuse to talk to you if you had mentioned these issues,” he said. “Now they are all for it.”
He visited Yerevan, some months ago, with a big delegation from Van. He says after the visit he became fiercely involved in “getting the cross installed on top.” He even paid for a builder from Armenia to do it, but there were problems with the “paperwork.” He complains that the authorities were not as eager as him.
We visit the governor as a tiny group of journalists. A soft-spoken man, he does not hide his opinion that the opening of the Armenian border is vital and urgent. What happened with the cross, then? Everything went smoothly with the restoration, and at a later stage, even with producing a cross, which was done under the supervision of the patriarchate in İstanbul, and sent to his office. But, at the last minute it was discovered that the restoration project, which involved an assortment of state, church, academia and institutions, local and abroad, did not include the part with the cross. It was not considered, nor mentioned. So, says the governor, when the building was restored, the construction was not strong enough to support the cross, which was no longer than 1.5 meters long and no heavier than some 50 kilos.
So, it lies there, at the building, unable to be unified with it. Not at the moment. It prevented some visitors from joining the ceremony -- the symbolism of the cross was strong enough for some of them to create pretexts not to do so, for some others a continuing suspicion prevailed about the genuine intentions of Ankara.
Meanwhile, thousands attended the moving ceremony, under unusually blue and beautiful skies, full of promises of a future of peace and reconciliation, and they did not seem to mind that not everything was in place. It was the notion of moving ahead, albeit with small steps, that mattered to them.
The Armenians, the majority of the passengers, came from various corners of the world. Some had flown by night flights via İstanbul or Vienna, reaching here from Armenia proper. The air was of a meet and greet, and talk came easily.
I met an old friend, from the Armenian community in İstanbul. I had not seen her for a long time. She was visibly sad when she saw me. “He should have been with us, now,” she said. The missing person was our mutual friend, the patriarch of İstanbul, Mesrob II, who has been gravely ill, incommunicado for months. “It was his dream,” she said, with tears in her eyes.
Indeed. I had first heard about the miserable state of the Church of the Holy Cross, known as Akdamar, from him years and years ago. He wanted it to be restored and opened for prayers, as much as he wanted the tiny, historic Silk Road bridge between Kars province and Armenia rebuilt. Both as symbolic gestures, small in size, but huge in impact, and to accelerate reconciliation and peace.
Thanks to efforts from various sides and institutions, and after a series of hurdles, Van finally witnessed an historic event. A thousand years of history has seen again the light of today, and the Armenians, sharers of these lands with others, were in tears while praying on the island, after a horrid period of darkness, for memory and forgiveness. It was more than a little step, to say the least.
The people of Van had anticipated with great excitement the idea that people would visit their city in great numbers, taking the event as a pretext, and experience their well-known hospitality. Fewer than expected arrived, mainly due to problems with the preparation work concerning the cross.
Overall, the restoration attracted praise. The work conducted inside and outside the church was meticulous. However, when it came to the cross, it was a complicated story.
“Well, my brother, what can I say? It is a church, so it should have a cross, is that correct? Can a church be complete without it? No!” Zahir Kandaşoğlu, the dynamic chairman of Van Chamber of Trade and Commerce, and a prominent figure from one of the province’s most powerful Kurdish tribes, reacts with open frustration that the cross could not be placed on top of the building for the ceremony. He is the driving force for opening the Armenian border, only two-and-a-half hours away, and he tells me funny stories about how the local Kurds changed their minds in favor of restoring the Armenian heritage, realizing how important it is for Van to open up to the world. “Before, those Kurds out there would refuse to talk to you if you had mentioned these issues,” he said. “Now they are all for it.”
He visited Yerevan, some months ago, with a big delegation from Van. He says after the visit he became fiercely involved in “getting the cross installed on top.” He even paid for a builder from Armenia to do it, but there were problems with the “paperwork.” He complains that the authorities were not as eager as him.
We visit the governor as a tiny group of journalists. A soft-spoken man, he does not hide his opinion that the opening of the Armenian border is vital and urgent. What happened with the cross, then? Everything went smoothly with the restoration, and at a later stage, even with producing a cross, which was done under the supervision of the patriarchate in İstanbul, and sent to his office. But, at the last minute it was discovered that the restoration project, which involved an assortment of state, church, academia and institutions, local and abroad, did not include the part with the cross. It was not considered, nor mentioned. So, says the governor, when the building was restored, the construction was not strong enough to support the cross, which was no longer than 1.5 meters long and no heavier than some 50 kilos.
So, it lies there, at the building, unable to be unified with it. Not at the moment. It prevented some visitors from joining the ceremony -- the symbolism of the cross was strong enough for some of them to create pretexts not to do so, for some others a continuing suspicion prevailed about the genuine intentions of Ankara.
Meanwhile, thousands attended the moving ceremony, under unusually blue and beautiful skies, full of promises of a future of peace and reconciliation, and they did not seem to mind that not everything was in place. It was the notion of moving ahead, albeit with small steps, that mattered to them.
The poverty of opposition -- and the media
The result of the referendum was not only a victory for those who voted “yes” to democratization or for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership, but also for an elderly gentleman whose name has strongly been linked with an endless pursuit for European-style social democracy in Turkey.
Tarhan Erdem, a gray-haired, soft-spoken analyst and pollster, is the owner of the renowned institution called KONDA. Erdem is a regular columnist at the Radikal daily, which is affiliated with the Doğan Media Group.
The newspaper often cooperated with KONDA, publishing its nationwide surveys on politics and other issues. It even included election predictions in past years. Because of its good reputation, KONDA’s findings have always drawn widespread attention, and had an impact on the debate.
However, the last survey, which preceded the referendum, became the subject of a scandal. Despite information that spread to various news outlets that the analysis would be published in Radikal three days before Sunday’s vote, it was fully censored (possibly by the management). Observers had access to the survey thanks to KONDA’s website, and rival Taraf published it a day later. In a nutshell, the survey predicted “yes” votes would win and come in at 56.8 percent.
This was yet another example of “freedom of the press” by one of its so-called “promoters” (Doğan Media). Indeed, just as the post-referendum days have also proven, the major loser of the vote was probably the “mainstream” media, which again failed to understand and analyze society, its trends and its pulse -- all in the hope of manipulating the “wind of change” against the AKP. It has once more become obvious that the media, resisting the push for democratization, is tumbling down into professional misery. Large segments of it, harshly under the control of owners hostile to the government, are visible as stumbling blocks against rather than channels for normalization.
These days the same media continue to be uncritical of the “new” Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition guided by Kemalism, and have become instrumental in vocalizing the excuses and pretexts for what went wrong. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the party’s leader, seems to have decided to act like a teflon politician, expressing satisfaction over the result, and declaring the defeat a success. His supporters in opinion columns refrain from asking for accountability, and the pattern is again the same as with the defeats of the past decade: proceeding with minimal self-criticism, with the same “reactionary” policies that are based on a harsh rhetoric of accusations.
What went wrong with the opposition? The naked truth tells a simple story: The CHP has declared its ideological poverty, and a high degree of political myopia. The failure became most visible in its choice of refusing to cooperate in the preparation of the reform package (in terms of helping with adjustments, etc.) as well as abstaining from all parliamentary voting on the amendment package; and, finally, foolishly turning the referendum into a vote of confidence for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party. This had its own traps.
Kılıçdaroğlu copy-pasted Bülent Ecevit’s persona of the 1970s, “touching” the people, but failing to convince them with his messages on the economy and, to a larger degree, why the republic was under siege by huge threats. At the end of the day, the CHP looked the same as under Deniz Baykal: a party in the chains of a dogmatic Kemalism, unable to be creative, other than in campaigning for “say no to Erdoğan!” The masses, and in particular the target group of the “oppressed and the poor,” did not buy it.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was simply erratic from the very beginning. Sticking obstinately to a “no” vote, its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, simply managed to alienate devoted voters deep in Anatolia, voters whose memories of the brutal military coup are still fresh.
The result is a huge disappointment for the opposition. Thanks to the robotic, reflexive, “no-substance” type politics, the opposition is now responsible for helping Erdoğan test his popularity, and his party’s declared direction for reform.
Two-thirds of the voters are for democratic change. A detailed analysis of even many of the coastline provinces in west and south of the country tell us that there is only a slight gap between the “yes” and “no” votes. This may point to a delicate balance of opinion, rather than division, on the transformation. The well-being of the economy helps increase the endorsement of reform even there.
Arguably, there is no point in dwelling too much on “what about the 42 percent who said no?” question. Enough will do, and the answer should be sought in this: Yes, there are fears, suspicion and hostility towards the AKP and its leader, but these sentiments and perceptions will never be managed well unless they are channeled rationally through radically revised policies within the CHP.
The crucial question, then, is whether the party will “wake up to the reality of Turkey 2010,” read the social change without the filters of Kemalism, open itself up to the social democratic values of Europe, revive the connections with the academia and youth, distance itself from militarism, stop denying the rights of ethnicity and belief and meet the people with an agenda which will be aimed at challenging the AKP on the content, speed and volume of democratization and prosperity. This is the only way to avoid the trap of spreading the lie that “Turkey is moving into darkness.” The CHP was responsible for the wrongs of yesterday, as it is for the wrongs of today and tomorrow. Turkey needs a smart and modern opposition.
Tarhan Erdem, a gray-haired, soft-spoken analyst and pollster, is the owner of the renowned institution called KONDA. Erdem is a regular columnist at the Radikal daily, which is affiliated with the Doğan Media Group.
The newspaper often cooperated with KONDA, publishing its nationwide surveys on politics and other issues. It even included election predictions in past years. Because of its good reputation, KONDA’s findings have always drawn widespread attention, and had an impact on the debate.
However, the last survey, which preceded the referendum, became the subject of a scandal. Despite information that spread to various news outlets that the analysis would be published in Radikal three days before Sunday’s vote, it was fully censored (possibly by the management). Observers had access to the survey thanks to KONDA’s website, and rival Taraf published it a day later. In a nutshell, the survey predicted “yes” votes would win and come in at 56.8 percent.
This was yet another example of “freedom of the press” by one of its so-called “promoters” (Doğan Media). Indeed, just as the post-referendum days have also proven, the major loser of the vote was probably the “mainstream” media, which again failed to understand and analyze society, its trends and its pulse -- all in the hope of manipulating the “wind of change” against the AKP. It has once more become obvious that the media, resisting the push for democratization, is tumbling down into professional misery. Large segments of it, harshly under the control of owners hostile to the government, are visible as stumbling blocks against rather than channels for normalization.
These days the same media continue to be uncritical of the “new” Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition guided by Kemalism, and have become instrumental in vocalizing the excuses and pretexts for what went wrong. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the party’s leader, seems to have decided to act like a teflon politician, expressing satisfaction over the result, and declaring the defeat a success. His supporters in opinion columns refrain from asking for accountability, and the pattern is again the same as with the defeats of the past decade: proceeding with minimal self-criticism, with the same “reactionary” policies that are based on a harsh rhetoric of accusations.
What went wrong with the opposition? The naked truth tells a simple story: The CHP has declared its ideological poverty, and a high degree of political myopia. The failure became most visible in its choice of refusing to cooperate in the preparation of the reform package (in terms of helping with adjustments, etc.) as well as abstaining from all parliamentary voting on the amendment package; and, finally, foolishly turning the referendum into a vote of confidence for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party. This had its own traps.
Kılıçdaroğlu copy-pasted Bülent Ecevit’s persona of the 1970s, “touching” the people, but failing to convince them with his messages on the economy and, to a larger degree, why the republic was under siege by huge threats. At the end of the day, the CHP looked the same as under Deniz Baykal: a party in the chains of a dogmatic Kemalism, unable to be creative, other than in campaigning for “say no to Erdoğan!” The masses, and in particular the target group of the “oppressed and the poor,” did not buy it.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was simply erratic from the very beginning. Sticking obstinately to a “no” vote, its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, simply managed to alienate devoted voters deep in Anatolia, voters whose memories of the brutal military coup are still fresh.
The result is a huge disappointment for the opposition. Thanks to the robotic, reflexive, “no-substance” type politics, the opposition is now responsible for helping Erdoğan test his popularity, and his party’s declared direction for reform.
Two-thirds of the voters are for democratic change. A detailed analysis of even many of the coastline provinces in west and south of the country tell us that there is only a slight gap between the “yes” and “no” votes. This may point to a delicate balance of opinion, rather than division, on the transformation. The well-being of the economy helps increase the endorsement of reform even there.
Arguably, there is no point in dwelling too much on “what about the 42 percent who said no?” question. Enough will do, and the answer should be sought in this: Yes, there are fears, suspicion and hostility towards the AKP and its leader, but these sentiments and perceptions will never be managed well unless they are channeled rationally through radically revised policies within the CHP.
The crucial question, then, is whether the party will “wake up to the reality of Turkey 2010,” read the social change without the filters of Kemalism, open itself up to the social democratic values of Europe, revive the connections with the academia and youth, distance itself from militarism, stop denying the rights of ethnicity and belief and meet the people with an agenda which will be aimed at challenging the AKP on the content, speed and volume of democratization and prosperity. This is the only way to avoid the trap of spreading the lie that “Turkey is moving into darkness.” The CHP was responsible for the wrongs of yesterday, as it is for the wrongs of today and tomorrow. Turkey needs a smart and modern opposition.
After a ‘yes’ win, political storm will gather, slowly
As the newspaper goes to print, the data flowing in from various corners of Turkey was vaguely projecting a win in the referendum, tipping a victory on the “yes” vote for the reform package.
First, it must be noted that Turkey did not experience a threatening incident, or provocation, which could have jeopardized the turnout and security of the polls. Reports from here and there were calming. This reassures us that Turkey has passed another test of “democratic maturity,” bringing society a bit closer to social stability and tolerance.
There is reason to be cautious about the outcome since the vote count primarily showed a strong presence of “yes” votes in the eastern and southeastern provinces. As I wrote my notes it looked as if, with “no” votes in the western parts somewhat balancing the overwhelming “yes” in the east, the final outcome would be around 55 percent “yes” (give or take). This prediction was based on the absence of a comprehensive vote count in İstanbul.
It should be taken as normal if the voters surprise us once more. The previous referendums showed us that the people tend to push for change, rather than act conservatively to consolidate the existing system. For years, studies and deep analysis also showed that citizens in general have had problems with various segments of the state bureaucracy and the mentality it represents. It is known that the judiciary has constantly lost credibility, as the military has recently. The demands for “normalization” have the essence of the desire of the people to be treated as real stakeholders and equals. Even the seemingly strong campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), to boycott the referendum, should be seen as a statement in that direction.
The stronger the yes, the more powerful its consequences will be. If the percentage is closer to 60 percent, a turmoil should be expected within the opposition, particularly in the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), but also in the Republican People’s Party (CHP). While the supporters of the MHP will ask “why did we so fiercely support a no?,” the new leadership of the CHP will possibly be confronted with the inquiry on “what went wrong with our campaign?.”
The debate expected there will expose the misreading of social currents and the inability to develop credible political programs.
This will mark the third big defeat for the adversaries of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). First, the old style opposition had to leave the stage, humiliated, in 2002. Second, the remnants of the so-called center-right – the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) -- had to disappear in 2007, due to miscalculations that the military would “teach a severe lesson” to the AK Party. This seems to be the third blow, and it will either minimize the size of the opposition to varying degrees, or force them to change internally.
It is harder to predict how the outcome will effect the Kurdish politics. Because it not only depends on the Kurdish dynamics themselves, but also how the ruling AK Part will interpret the result of the referendum and whether it will reassert a decisive reform policy on the demands of Kurds.
Finally, this must be said: the referendum was a test as a vote of confidence for the AK Party, and a dress rehearsal for the upcoming presidential elections (due in 2012). Erdoğan was aware of this and wanted to have the test; he has had his self-esteem reassured. It will be up to him to carry Turkey further and it will be even more exciting whether he expands his democratic agenda – or narrows it.
First, it must be noted that Turkey did not experience a threatening incident, or provocation, which could have jeopardized the turnout and security of the polls. Reports from here and there were calming. This reassures us that Turkey has passed another test of “democratic maturity,” bringing society a bit closer to social stability and tolerance.
There is reason to be cautious about the outcome since the vote count primarily showed a strong presence of “yes” votes in the eastern and southeastern provinces. As I wrote my notes it looked as if, with “no” votes in the western parts somewhat balancing the overwhelming “yes” in the east, the final outcome would be around 55 percent “yes” (give or take). This prediction was based on the absence of a comprehensive vote count in İstanbul.
It should be taken as normal if the voters surprise us once more. The previous referendums showed us that the people tend to push for change, rather than act conservatively to consolidate the existing system. For years, studies and deep analysis also showed that citizens in general have had problems with various segments of the state bureaucracy and the mentality it represents. It is known that the judiciary has constantly lost credibility, as the military has recently. The demands for “normalization” have the essence of the desire of the people to be treated as real stakeholders and equals. Even the seemingly strong campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), to boycott the referendum, should be seen as a statement in that direction.
The stronger the yes, the more powerful its consequences will be. If the percentage is closer to 60 percent, a turmoil should be expected within the opposition, particularly in the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), but also in the Republican People’s Party (CHP). While the supporters of the MHP will ask “why did we so fiercely support a no?,” the new leadership of the CHP will possibly be confronted with the inquiry on “what went wrong with our campaign?.”
The debate expected there will expose the misreading of social currents and the inability to develop credible political programs.
This will mark the third big defeat for the adversaries of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). First, the old style opposition had to leave the stage, humiliated, in 2002. Second, the remnants of the so-called center-right – the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) -- had to disappear in 2007, due to miscalculations that the military would “teach a severe lesson” to the AK Party. This seems to be the third blow, and it will either minimize the size of the opposition to varying degrees, or force them to change internally.
It is harder to predict how the outcome will effect the Kurdish politics. Because it not only depends on the Kurdish dynamics themselves, but also how the ruling AK Part will interpret the result of the referendum and whether it will reassert a decisive reform policy on the demands of Kurds.
Finally, this must be said: the referendum was a test as a vote of confidence for the AK Party, and a dress rehearsal for the upcoming presidential elections (due in 2012). Erdoğan was aware of this and wanted to have the test; he has had his self-esteem reassured. It will be up to him to carry Turkey further and it will be even more exciting whether he expands his democratic agenda – or narrows it.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Kurdish boycott’ a fading option
With the referendum approaching, a review of public and not-so-public opinion polls present the following view: “Yes” votes seem to be stabilizing at around 55 percent, and “no” votes and undecided votes (which may be dominated by intimidation or political pressure) at 45 percent. Several serious pollsters I have constantly been in touch with agree that “yes” votes are on the slow increase.
We have rough ideas of where party support stands. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), more than three pollsters say, is now above 42 percent, which is explained by the so-called “Supreme Military Council [YAŞ] crisis” -- on the choices and appointments of the top echelons of the military command. It is rather obvious that the public perceives the “crisis” as a political “derivative” of what happened on April 27, 2007, when the top command issued an extremely threatening e-memorandum against the government.
All pollsters point out that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is descending from about 30 percent to slightly above 20-23 percent. The surveys say that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s performance during the referendum campaign has created some disappointment, mainly due to harsh, combative, out-of-context rhetoric, perceived as a “bad copy” of Baykal’s style. One may predict that a possible defeat of the “no” side will mean trouble for the new CHP leadership, which could have chosen a softer style, leaving its voters more flexible and free. An obstinate “no” campaign now seems to be a huge gamble for the Kılıçdaroğlu line and might diminish the chances of preparing the CHP for the next national elections as a credible, hopeful, intelligent and reformed party.
The divisive effects of the referendum are also to be seen within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which carried out a staunch “no” campaign from the very beginning. But the feedback it received has, it seems, been that of confusion and objection. A reliable source recently told me that the last meeting of the party’s executives turned into a session of harsh criticism of what is seen as the “obsessive line” of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli. The growing vocal discontent there is based on surveys that say around a quarter of the MHP grass roots might defy the party line and vote “yes.”
Some party officials see danger ahead if the “yes” votes win, as the MHP will sink into a destructive vortex. Prominent figures feel uneasy that, by sticking to a categorical “no,” the party, which has performed relatively well in terms of protecting parliamentary democracy in recent years, now risks being perceived as an anti-democratic one -- the more the AK Party drives the reform line and the more lasting the PKK cease-fire is.
The PKK and its elected political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), are also being forced to seriously reconsider their stance. The PKK’s declared cease-fire, however fragile it may be, has two basic causes. First, the resolution of the YAŞ meeting in favor of the ruling AK Party has shown that civilians are slowly, but surely, taking control over the “autonomous” military, and this does not escape the attention of the common Turk or, more importantly, the Kurds.
Abdullah Öcalan and PKK commanders as well as the BDP have come to realize that, if the Kurdish initiative is to continue, it will have to be with the government and no longer the “state within.”
Second, the very nature of the reform package, and in particular its symbolic way of dealing with the ill spirit of the military coup, has led to a division among Kurds. And when this state of mind was confronted with the mine explosion incident in Batman (where four known Kurds died) and Dörtyol (where complex relations between the PKK and the deep state elements were exposed), a new civilian Kurdish dynamic emerged, forcing the PKK/BDP line to declare a cease-fire and phase out the rhetoric on calling for a boycott.
At this juncture, how the Kurds will act (without forgetting the traps of the fragile cease-fire, certainly) will define the future path of reform and normalization. My Kurdish sources, both hawks and doves, agree that this cease-fire is the “most serious one” after the one in 1993 that was initiated by the late President Turgut Özal. They agree that both sides are now extremely tired of fighting, and this may revive the “initiative.”
At the moment, the question is no longer whether the Kurds will boycott the Sept. 12 referendum. Rather, it is how high their turnout and how strong the “yes” vote will be. Polls (some unpublished) say over 75 percent of Kurds in Diyarbakır have declared that they will -- if necessary -- defy the boycott (this was before Öcalan said that the boycott was not a necessity).
In this sense, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stands once more before a great opportunity to strike a “bond of fraternity” with Turkey’s Kurds. He will visit Diyarbakır on Sept. 3 as well as other predominantly Kurdish cities around the same time. What he says, and does, will have a tremendous effect on the outcome of the vote as well as the pace and content of the reform process. There is no doubt that winning the hearts of Kurds will mean winning the battle for democracy.
We have rough ideas of where party support stands. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), more than three pollsters say, is now above 42 percent, which is explained by the so-called “Supreme Military Council [YAŞ] crisis” -- on the choices and appointments of the top echelons of the military command. It is rather obvious that the public perceives the “crisis” as a political “derivative” of what happened on April 27, 2007, when the top command issued an extremely threatening e-memorandum against the government.
All pollsters point out that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is descending from about 30 percent to slightly above 20-23 percent. The surveys say that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s performance during the referendum campaign has created some disappointment, mainly due to harsh, combative, out-of-context rhetoric, perceived as a “bad copy” of Baykal’s style. One may predict that a possible defeat of the “no” side will mean trouble for the new CHP leadership, which could have chosen a softer style, leaving its voters more flexible and free. An obstinate “no” campaign now seems to be a huge gamble for the Kılıçdaroğlu line and might diminish the chances of preparing the CHP for the next national elections as a credible, hopeful, intelligent and reformed party.
The divisive effects of the referendum are also to be seen within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which carried out a staunch “no” campaign from the very beginning. But the feedback it received has, it seems, been that of confusion and objection. A reliable source recently told me that the last meeting of the party’s executives turned into a session of harsh criticism of what is seen as the “obsessive line” of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli. The growing vocal discontent there is based on surveys that say around a quarter of the MHP grass roots might defy the party line and vote “yes.”
Some party officials see danger ahead if the “yes” votes win, as the MHP will sink into a destructive vortex. Prominent figures feel uneasy that, by sticking to a categorical “no,” the party, which has performed relatively well in terms of protecting parliamentary democracy in recent years, now risks being perceived as an anti-democratic one -- the more the AK Party drives the reform line and the more lasting the PKK cease-fire is.
The PKK and its elected political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), are also being forced to seriously reconsider their stance. The PKK’s declared cease-fire, however fragile it may be, has two basic causes. First, the resolution of the YAŞ meeting in favor of the ruling AK Party has shown that civilians are slowly, but surely, taking control over the “autonomous” military, and this does not escape the attention of the common Turk or, more importantly, the Kurds.
Abdullah Öcalan and PKK commanders as well as the BDP have come to realize that, if the Kurdish initiative is to continue, it will have to be with the government and no longer the “state within.”
Second, the very nature of the reform package, and in particular its symbolic way of dealing with the ill spirit of the military coup, has led to a division among Kurds. And when this state of mind was confronted with the mine explosion incident in Batman (where four known Kurds died) and Dörtyol (where complex relations between the PKK and the deep state elements were exposed), a new civilian Kurdish dynamic emerged, forcing the PKK/BDP line to declare a cease-fire and phase out the rhetoric on calling for a boycott.
At this juncture, how the Kurds will act (without forgetting the traps of the fragile cease-fire, certainly) will define the future path of reform and normalization. My Kurdish sources, both hawks and doves, agree that this cease-fire is the “most serious one” after the one in 1993 that was initiated by the late President Turgut Özal. They agree that both sides are now extremely tired of fighting, and this may revive the “initiative.”
At the moment, the question is no longer whether the Kurds will boycott the Sept. 12 referendum. Rather, it is how high their turnout and how strong the “yes” vote will be. Polls (some unpublished) say over 75 percent of Kurds in Diyarbakır have declared that they will -- if necessary -- defy the boycott (this was before Öcalan said that the boycott was not a necessity).
In this sense, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stands once more before a great opportunity to strike a “bond of fraternity” with Turkey’s Kurds. He will visit Diyarbakır on Sept. 3 as well as other predominantly Kurdish cities around the same time. What he says, and does, will have a tremendous effect on the outcome of the vote as well as the pace and content of the reform process. There is no doubt that winning the hearts of Kurds will mean winning the battle for democracy.
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